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INTRODUCTION 
HE right not only to a day in court, but to a fair day in court as 
defined by the court’s procedural rules, once was a fundamen-
tal principle within the American system of justice: no man was 
permitted to bargain away his right to a fair hearing out of contrac-
tual benefit or necessity.1 No longer. Contracts modifying the spec-
trum of procedure, from commonplace jury-trial waivers to sophis-
ticated alterations of evidentiary obligations and burdens of proof, 
are now broadly enforceable.2 Last Term, the Supreme Court fur-
ther expanded the power of procedural contracts in Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.3 and Stolt-Nielson 
 
1 See, e.g., Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928); Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 
Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (“A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his 
substantial rights . . . . In a civil case . . . any citizen may no doubt waive the rights to 
which he may be entitled. He cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an agree-
ment, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on 
all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.”). 
2 See Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake 
the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 579, 612 
(2007); Chris W. Sanchirico & George Triantis, Evidentiary Arbitrage: The Fabrica-
tion of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Performance, 24 J.L. Econ. & Org. 
72, 72–73 (2008); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and 
Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 167, 
200–04 (2004). 
3 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443–44 (2010) (allowing a class action to proceed under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 even though the class-action device was expressly unavail-
able under state law). 
T 
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S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,4 indicating that broadly 
enforceable forum-selection agreements will now presumptively 
determine the availability of a class action—an outcome many 
thought was well beyond the ambit of private ordering.5 Procedural 
private ordering holds immense promise, permitting corporations 
to use customized procedure not only to generate efficiency gains 
by precluding ex post escalation but also to reinforce ex ante con-
ceptions about the parties’ substantive obligations, adjusting en-
forcement to the parties’ ex ante preferred level.6 But set against 
these benefits are very real questions about the repercussions of 
permitting fine print terms in consumer, employment, or even 
clickwrap agreements to function as de facto liability waivers.7 
The conversion of procedural rules from publicly created, man-
datory guarantors of procedural justice to default rules subject to 
market forces alters the nature and function of civil procedure at a 
basic level. As exemplified by the party-created procedures at issue 
this Term in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,8 the traditional con-
 
4 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (holding that parties must specifically contract to cre-
ate a class-action device in arbitration). The ability of parties to contract for proce-
dure in the context of arbitration has been a source of continuing interest to the Su-
preme Court. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, W. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010) 
(upholding ex ante contractual delegation of unconscionability determination to arbi-
trator, thus overriding default procedure whereby the court would decide uncon-
scionability). 
5 See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1782 n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In contrast to 
the facially evident impact of class-waiver provisions, a forum-selection provision can 
prevent the formation of a class (as in Stolt-Nielsen) or create an otherwise unavail-
able class action proceeding (as in Shady Grove) without expressly stating these sec-
ondary impacts. Because these unstated impacts are inherently concealed and poten-
tially more uncertain, they may impede proper valuation and market functioning. 
6 See generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 23 J. Legal Stud. 307 (1994) (recognizing that heightened accuracy is 
typically obtained only at a cost and arguing that the balance between efficiency and 
accuracy, with its resulting impact upon deterrence, is best made on a case-by-case 
basis). 
7 See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agree-
ments and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 379, 427–30 (2006); Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One 
Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 984, 990 (2008). 
8 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted 
state unconscionability doctrine that would otherwise invalidate the parties’ class ar-
bitration waiver, and noting that the District Court had concluded that the plaintiffs 
were “better off” under the contractual provision than in a class action given the in-
herent delays and fractional recovery aggregate proceedings often generate). 
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ception of private enforcement as serving a dual public and private 
role is now being fundamentally challenged by this new generation 
of procedural contracting, as parties can create provisions that si-
multaneously provide superior remedies or even super-
compensation to the parties,9 while decreasing overall enforce-
ment.10 Fundamental normative questions about the role of civil 
procedure emerge from these types of conflicts between the tradi-
tionally defined concepts of public and private interest—questions 
whose resolution is prerequisite to determining the limits of proce-
dural private ordering. 
But the implications transcend civil procedure as the intrinsic re-
lationship between procedure and substance allows contracting 
parties to use procedure to effectively limit or preclude enforce-
ment of claims. Parties are now using procedural terms to opt out 
of non-waivable statutory obligations in contexts ranging from se-
 
9 The AT&T provision waived aggregate procedures, utilizing the cost savings to 
increase net recovery for those individuals that chose to file claims. Among the most 
notable features of AT&T’s provision were contractually created double attorneys’ 
fees and a minimum recovery provision of $7,500 for any plaintiff that obtained more 
in arbitration than AT&T’s last settlement offer, while simultaneously denying AT&T 
the ability to recover attorneys’ fees, requiring AT&T to pay all costs for non-
frivolous arbitration claims, and permitting telephonic hearings. Id. at 1744. While the 
Court’s enforcement of the contract turned upon preemption grounds unique to arbi-
tration and not upon these enhanced recovery provisions, corporations are increas-
ingly including these provisions to ensure compliance with the fundamental-fairness 
and substantive-waiver requirements applied to procedural contract terms. See infra 
Section I.A.  
10 The class arbitration waiver upheld in Concepcion allows companies to avoid 
most—but not all—class actions, through simply contracting for arbitration. Even su-
per-damages provisions like those of AT&T that provide for heightened damages are 
almost certain to result in lower total damages and litigation costs than an aggregate 
action would yield, as most low-value harms are ones that individuals bear without 
seeking recovery. This observation gives rise to the competing views that low partici-
pation rates are, on the one hand, evidence of sub-optimal over-enforcement under 
the current regime or, on the other hand, necessary to overcome a collective action 
problem with respect to small-value harms. 
 In the wake of Concepcion it seems certain that calls for reform of the Federal Ar-
bitration Act—or, more realistically, intervention by the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau—will accompany reports of the demise of class actions and concerns that 
the deterrent function of private litigation has been eviscerated, leaving companies 
free to perpetrate individually small value harms with relative impunity. But, what-
ever the result with respect to arbitral provisions, these same issues must be con-
fronted with respect to private ordering within litigation if these changes are to have 
any more effect than simply shifting aggregation waivers from arbitral to litigation 
forums. 
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curities to employment laws. Parties are also using procedural 
terms to reduce the value of substantive rights by increasing en-
forcement costs, decreasing available remedies, and changing the 
burdens of proof and rules of evidence. These modifications can be 
as devastating to the underlying substantive law as a complete 
waiver: the right to be paid the minimum wage or to be free of 
usury will be of little value to a day laborer in California if he must 
bring suit in Maine to enforce his rights, functionally barring pur-
suit of his claim. To the extent that we recognize either by dint of 
the Constitution or statute that some rights are non-waivable, so 
too must be the foundational right of resort to the courts unless the 
role of the public attorney general is to be vastly expanded. 
The existing procedural-contracting scholarship has generally 
studied particular terms in isolation.11 In the past few years, schol-
ars have begun to contemplate the possibility of procedural private 
ordering across the full panoply of procedural rights.12 These forays 
have focused upon the benefits of commercial contracting or the 
risks of consumer and employment contracting rather than under-
taking a comprehensive study of the phenomenon of private order-
ing.13 As a result, no systemic analysis has explored the contours of 
 
11 One line of commentary focuses upon the Court’s specific approval of choice-of-
law and forum-selection provisions, asking whether these procedural changes could 
impede substantive enforcement of the law. See, e.g., Janet C. Alexander, Unlimited 
Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 387, 388–89 
(1992); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 
431, 452–62 (1993); Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 Yale L.J. 1935, 1940–
41 (1991). Another line of scholarship analyzes the use of customized procedure in 
arbitration, asking whether this private ordering results in systemic biases against cer-
tain parties—notably consumers and employees. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbi-
tration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1420, 1422 (2008); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Fried-
man, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepre-
neurial Lawyers, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103, 154–55 (2006); David Horton, The Shadow 
Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 605, 665–
67 (2010); David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1949, 
1980–81 (2008). 
12 See, e.g., Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil 
Procedure Negotiable, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 461, 462 (2007) (arguing “for a funda-
mentally different conception of the rules governing litigation . . . as default rules, 
rather than as non-negotiable parameters”). 
13 For arguments, predominantly by commercial contract scholars, favoring broader 
procedural contracting, see, e.g., Noyes, supra note 2, at 599–638; Robert J. Rhee, 
Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. 
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procedural contracting or assessed the conditions under which pri-
vate ordering should be denied enforcement due to an overriding 
public concern sufficient to trump the parties’ contract.14 
This Article seeks to take these next steps by evaluating the ex-
isting procedural contracting doctrine against the realities of mod-
ern procedural private ordering. In doing so, this Article has two 
objectives. The first is to examine the modern scope of procedural 
private ordering as juxtaposed with the Supreme Court’s assump-
tions in this regard. This inquiry reveals a significant disconnect be-
tween the implicit ex ante content-neutral paradigm of procedure 
and the manifest potential for manipulation of substance through 
procedural contracting. This conclusion has two significant implica-
tions: First, in circumstances where individuals are uniquely unable 
to properly weigh the effect of procedural modifications, whether 
because of information costs or incorrect decisional heuristics, de-
fault allocations of rights may be waived without offsetting com-
pensation, potentially undermining the plethora of enforcement 
schemes dependent upon private rights of action. Second, parties 
can evade substantive restrictions on the waiver or limitation of 
rights by using procedural terms to obtain the prohibited ends. The 
ability of contracting parties to rewrite substantive law to their own 
ends, not only with respect to waivable claims but also with respect 
to those fundamental rights designated as unalterable, encourages 
the use of procedure to contract around substantive rights. 
 
L. Rev. 514, 518 (2009); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litiga-
tion in Contract Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814, 856–78 (2006). For arguments against a 
permissive approach to procedural contracting, offered predominantly by civil proce-
dure and employment scholars, see, e.g., Estlund, supra note 7, at 427–30; Meredith 
R. Miller, Contracting Out of Process, Contracting Out of Corporate Accountability: 
An Argument Against Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Limits on Process, 75 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 365, 367–70 (2008); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 593, 622–27 (2005); David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Con-
tract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of 
Congressional Control, 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1085, 1085–87 (2002). 
14 See Scott & Triantis, supra note 13, at 857 (“Although arbitration and venue 
clauses are common in contracts and widely discussed in the literature, the fact that 
parties can vary the rules of litigation in their ex ante contract is relatively unex-
plored.”); Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing Procedure 2 (Dec. 31, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323056) 
(“[P]re-dispute arrangements to modify the rules of procedure have been essentially 
overlooked in contract law scholarship so far. Likewise, procedure scholars have paid 
little attention to the intriguing concept of pre-dispute contractualized procedure.”). 
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The Article’s second aim is to explore the normative implica-
tions of procedural private ordering. While the protective limits of 
civil procedure traditionally focused primarily upon protecting the 
individual’s due process rights from public intrusion, I argue that 
we are on the precipice of the next generation of civil procedure, 
which should incorporate a corollary examination of the limitations 
upon procedural contracting necessary to protect the public inter-
est. This public-private tension operates on two levels in proce-
dural contracting. The first set of questions focuses upon the extent 
to which parties should be allowed to shape their adjudicative 
processes or, alternatively stated, commandeer the public litigation 
system. To the extent that procedure affects substance, procedural 
private ordering creates a second-order set of questions, engaging 
the broader debate over the extent to which substantive private 
ordering is permitted. While ex post procedural modifications and 
even settlement typically cannot affect parties’ incentives to com-
ply with their legal obligations, the rise of ex ante procedural con-
tracts permits parties to adjust substantive obligations and ex-
pected liability. While the duality of private rights of action as 
simultaneously private and public is well-established, private or-
dering presses difficult questions about which interest is superior 
when the two conflict. The end of civil procedure as a mandatory 
guarantor of procedural justice and its replacement by market 
forces has the capacity to reshape not only the role of the private 
right of action between contracting parties but also the broad 
swath of statutory, constitutional, and common law obligations that 
rely upon it as a primary mechanism of enforcement. 
Part I lays a doctrinal foundation for the exploration of proce-
dural private ordering before examining the scope of existing pro-
cedural contracting. In contrast to the traditional assumption that 
procedural terms are primarily used to generate certainty and re-
lated efficiency gains in litigation, it argues that parties can strate-
gically contract to manipulate substantive law and outcomes in a 
far more fundamental way than previously recognized. This occurs 
not only through traditional elections of systems of law, as with 
choice-of-law and forum-selection provisions (which I term “bun-
dled procedure”), but also through the new phenomenon of “un-
bundled procedure” that allows parties to customize particular 
rules of procedure. The innovation of unbundled procedure per-
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mits precise manipulation of procedure to further particular sub-
stantive goals, such as increasing overall enforcement while de-
creasing the possibility of nuisance or blackmail suits. This Part ar-
gues that the courts’ embrace of increasing levels of commercial 
private ordering to obtain these efficiency gains has left the door 
open to equally broad consumer terms, which can limit the en-
forcement of even non-waivable statutory and constitutional rights. 
Part II examines the traditional assumptions about the necessity 
and scope of limits upon procedural contracting and argues that 
the Supreme Court’s existing doctrine fails to account for key fea-
tures of a market for procedure, resulting in systemic enforcement 
failures with respect to both commercial and individual contracts. 
First, it employs an economic method of analysis to ex ante con-
tracts for procedure to test the Rehnquist Court’s functioning-
market assumption—the cornerstone of the modern doctrine.15 Its 
conclusion, that unique information cost asymmetries in proce-
dural contracting increase the risk of market failure in certain cir-
cumstances, provides the first explanation for the oft-noted but 
under-theorized dichotomy between procedural terms in commer-
cial contracts and those in individual contracts. Second, in contrast 
to traditional arguments that private ordering impairs judicial func-
tioning, it argues that ex post restrictions upon private ordering al-
ready define the sine qua non of judicial functioning and that ar-
guments for a more restrictive ex ante standard are actually 
misidentified concerns about market failure. Third, it identifies the 
hydraulic effect created by the discontinuity between the standards 
applied to procedural and substantive private ordering under the 
existing doctrine, such that procedural terms can be used to subvert 
statutory or constitutional prohibitions on bargaining. 
In response to this framework of necessary limitations, Part III 
develops what I term the “symmetrical theory” of procedural con-
tracting and provides examples of the manner in which the theory 
could be operationalized as a doctrinal approach. It argues that the 
proposed system is better tailored than the existing doctrine to the 
normative concerns animating both sides of the private-ordering 
 
15 The effect of procedural modification is often expressly excluded from economic 
analysis. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Mar-
kets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Securities Interests, 69 Va. 
L. Rev. 1387, 1450 (1983); Scott & Triantis, supra note 13, at 857. 
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debate and creates the starting point for a unified approach to pro-
cedural private ordering. In place of the Court’s existing preclusion 
approach to procedural private ordering, this Article advocates the 
symmetrical theory of procedural contracting. This theory stems 
from the core presumption that procedure is intended to facilitate 
enforcement of substantive law; use of procedure to subvert the 
rule of law by contracting for prohibited outcomes is inconsistent 
with the proper function of procedure. Under this approach, those 
modifications of substantive law that are barred by the legislature 
are equally impermissible if obtained through procedural mecha-
nisms. So too, if we prohibit the parties from making certain pro-
cedural modifications during litigation, those modifications should 
not be permitted by ex ante agreement. This approach, I argue, is 
commended by rigorous analysis of the normative goals justifying 
limitation upon private ordering, each of which is better served by 
the symmetrical approach than the preclusion approach. 
I. THE RISE OF PROCEDURAL PRIVATE ORDERING 
The existing doctrine affords parties substantial latitude in alter-
ing procedure, reasoning that allowing parties to tailor the process 
to their particular dispute can increase both certainty16 and effi-
ciency.17 While this observation is true, it is incomplete as it ne-
glects the effect procedure can have upon substance. Under federal 
law, procedural terms are currently enforced without regard to 
substantive consequences unless the term either directly contra-
venes a procedure expressly provided for in the statute upon which 
the claim is based or precludes a claim or defense altogether.18 As a 
result, terms that substantially alter the parties’ substantive obliga-
tions or the likelihood of liability are enforceable even with respect 
to non-waivable claims.19 I argue that, as a result, parties are not 
merely bargaining for “better” procedure; they are selecting pro-
 
16 See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13–17 & n.15 (1972) (citing 
certainty six times as a justification for enforcing a forum-selection provision). 
17 See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991) (enforcing forum 
selection as a method of reducing inefficiency through election of a single forum). 
18 See infra Section I.A. 
19 See infra Section I.A; cf. Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1919, 1921, 1926–29 (2009) (“Forum is worth fighting over because out-
come often turns on forum . . . .”). 
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cedure against the backdrop of the effect it will have upon their le-
gal obligations and expected liability. 
Building upon this foundation, I contend that parties are no 
longer merely selecting among systems of procedure through 
“bundled” elections of a forum, decision maker, and procedural 
rules. Instead, parties are contracting for “unbundled” procedure, 
selecting individual procedures to create a customized “mini-code 
of civil procedure.”20 Drawing upon law and economics and con-
tract theory, I argue that procedural terms can be used to take ad-
vantage of the substance-procedure interaction, creating agree-
ments that more precisely implement the parties’ ex ante 
substantive enforcement preferences. Unbundling thus facilitates 
the development of procedural rules that reinforce the parties’ ex 
ante preferred level of substantive obligation through careful ad-
justment of the numerous levers of procedure affecting litigation 
costs and accuracy, including shifting expected recovery or even de 
facto precluding the presentation of a claim or defense altogether. 
While the existing doctrine permits beneficial procedural tailor-
ing, it also leaves the door open to parties using procedure to con-
tract around limitations on substantive private ordering. With re-
spect to private enforcement actions, parties can in effect waive 
their non-waivable rights through procedural contracting, convert-
ing all private rights of action into mere default rules that can read-
ily be bargained away even if the substantive statute deems the 
right inalienable.21 
Having identified procedural contracting as a mechanism for 
modifying litigation outcomes, it becomes apparent that procedural 
contracting is a component of the broader debate over private or-
dering of the rules governing legal obligations. At one end of the 
 
20 See Resnik, supra note 13, at 597 (using the term “mini-codes of civil procedure” 
to refer to the creation of rules structures “by courts, agencies, and a multitude of pri-
vate providers” where claims are “outsourc[ed]” from traditional adjudication). 
 21 As I note elsewhere, this observation is limited to private enforcement; this limita-
tion, however, simply results in a choice between lower levels of enforcement or an 
increase in public enforcement, undermining the legislature’s decision to allow private 
enforcement to replace or mitigate the need for the deployment of public resources in 
the effectuation of these policy objectives. Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 
287–88, 296–97 (2002) (holding that employee’s agreement to arbitrate did not bar 
public action on his behalf or the pursuit of victim-specific relief, although victim-
specific defenses would be valid defenses to the public enforcement action). 
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spectrum lie pure creations of substantive rights; this category can 
be further disaggregated into those terms that create substantive 
rights and duties by contract and those that modify preexisting sub-
stantive rights. Next are hybrid provisions, which use quasi-
procedural terms as a pass-through for the modification of substan-
tive rights. Choice-of-law provisions and, to a lesser extent, choice-
of-forum provisions are familiar exemplars of this hybrid category. 
Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum lie purely procedural 
terms. Within this category are two types of provisions with slightly 
different implications for judicial integrity: those that restrain or 
compel action by the parties and those that modify the judge’s or 
factfinder’s identity, conduct, or inquiry. While the primary focus 
here is upon the emergence of procedural terms, situating the 
analysis within this broader framework is a useful construct in un-
derstanding the doctrinal evolution described in this Part. With this 
background, this Part explores the current scope of procedural 
contracts, including the use of procedure to regulate substance. 
The consequences of this investigation are significant. After a 
half-century of failed attempts to demarcate a line between sub-
stance and procedure,22 it seems evident that procedure affects sub-
stance.23 If this proposition is correct, then procedural terms are not 
intrinsically limited to content-neutral means of adjusting the cost-
accuracy tradeoff to correspond to parties’ ex ante preferences in 
light of the particular substantive rights at stake. Instead, proce-
dural terms can adjust parties’ ex ante expectations about the value 
of their underlying substantive rights and influence primary-
activity conduct.24 To the extent that procedural contracting is mo-
tivated by efficient truth-finding and only incidentally affects sub-
stantive rights, it may appear that strong enforcement is appropri-
 
22 See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (commenting 
that identification of the line between substance and procedure is a “challenging en-
deavor”); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (“The line between ‘substance’ 
and ‘procedure’ shifts as the legal context changes.”). 
23 See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1450 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); 
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427; Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 (noting that, in a sense, “every pro-
cedural variation is ‘outcome-determinative’”); S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.). 
24 For discussion in the context of burden allocation, see Scott & Triantis, supra note 
13, at 860–64. 
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ate absent any preclusive effect upon the underlying right—so long 
as both parties agree to the reallocation of cost and accuracy and 
so long as the risk of error is not so large as to impede the public 
interest in deterrence. But if parties instead may deliberately use 
procedure to modify substantive rights and deterrence, then the 
Supreme Court’s strong deference may be an inadequate check 
upon market mechanisms. This concern is particularly acute where 
background law prevents direct modification of the substantive 
right, creating a “hydraulic effect” whereby parties use procedure 
to obtain prohibited substantive ends.25 This Part addresses these 
possibilities. 
A. Enforcement of Procedural Contracts 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
Supreme Court’s limitations upon ex ante procedural contracting 
derived from concerns with the public function of courts embodied 
in the English ouster doctrine and with the private individual’s 
procedural rights as reflected in the nascent American conception 
of due process.26 During this period, the Court limited the handful 
of attempts at ex ante private ordering, reasoning that 
[e]very citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, 
and to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts 
may afford him. A man may not barter away his life or his free-
dom, or his substantial rights. . . . In a civil case . . . any citizen 
may no doubt waive the rights to which he may be entitled. He 
cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an agreement, 
which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all 
times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.27 
As ouster gave way to non-adjudicatory methods of dispute 
resolution28 and as due process became recognized as a waivable 
 
25 See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 183, 
213–14 (discussing the “‘hydraulic’ effect” in aggregate litigation strategy). 
26 See Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874); see also Richard C. Reu-
ben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
85 Cal. L. Rev. 577, 600 (1997); Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 13, at 1093. 
27 Morse, 87 U.S. at 451. 
28 See Reuben, supra note 26, at 601 (discussing the 1925 passage of the Federal Ar-
bitration Act). 
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right,29 the Warren30 and Burger31 Courts tentatively embraced pro-
cedural private ordering. The Court struggled, however, to articu-
late a test that captured its instinctive desire to enforce carefully 
bargained contracts between sophisticated corporations engaged in 
international commerce while also protecting consumers unaware 
of the magnitude of the rights they were waiving or unable to con-
tract for alternative terms.32 
The current chapter in the jurisprudence of procedural contract-
ing began with the forum-selection provision of Carnival Cruise 
Lines v. Shute.33 In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Rehnquist Court 
abandoned the endeavor to distinguish between sophisticated 
commercial and fine-print consumer contracts, creating a presump-
tion of enforceability expressly premised upon an assumption of 
market functioning.34 Enforceability first required that the term be 
“reasonable,” an inherently vague standard satisfied by the se-
lected forum’s strong ties to the corporation, proper notice, lack of 
fraud, and an opportunity to reject the provision, which was em-
bedded in the eighth of twenty-five fine-print paragraphs presented 
after the refund deadline.35 The Court then articulated a second, 
constitutional requirement of fundamental fairness, which invali-
dated procedural terms intended to preclude enforcement of one’s 
claim.36 Since the adoption of this freedom-of-procedural-contracts 
 
29 For historical development, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378–79 
(1971). Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (discussing the development of 
recognition of due process waiver in the context of a replevin dispute). 
30 See Nat’l Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964). 
31 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975); The 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. 
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187–88 (1972). 
32 See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12–13 (“[A] freely negotiated private international 
agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power, 
such as [the forum-selection clause] involved here, should be given full effect.”); 
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95–96 (holding that a fine-print consumer replevin provision was 
not clear enough to waive constitutional due process rights); Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 
186 (noting that the parties were sophisticated corporations represented by counsel, 
the bargaining power was not unequal, the terms were not adhesive, and the chal-
lenged term was specifically added in exchange “for substantial benefits and consid-
eration to Overmyer”). 
33 499 U.S. 585, 587–88 (1991). 
34 See id. at 593–94. The Court did not adopt a market-function test or require any 
evidence to support its assumption of indirect compensation. 
35 Id. at 593–95; see also id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
36 Id. at 595 (majority opinion). 
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approach, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find that a pro-
cedural contract violates fundamental fairness.37 The courts of ap-
peals have since held that choice-of-forum and choice-of-law 
clauses are enforceable even where enforcement would result in 
both waiver of a non-waivable statute and lesser remedies under 
foreign law.38 
Although arbitration agreements are a special subset of proce-
dural contracts, the Court applies essentially the same standard, 
denying enforcement to arbitration agreements that “oper-
ate[] . . . as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statu-
tory remedies.”39 As in the litigation context, the modern Court has 
interpreted this requirement minimally, refusing to deny enforce-
ment of the arbitration agreement where the preclusion might or 
 
37 See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 
535–36 (1995) (applying Carnival Cruise Lines to reject the argument that enforce-
ment would be impermissibly reduced by the high transaction costs of foreign arbitra-
tion where a statute provided that liability may not be “lessen[ed]”); Carnival Cruise 
Lines, 499 U.S. at 595–96 (rejecting arguments that the statutory prohibitions on waiv-
ing or lessening the substantive right to recover for personal injury or “purport-
ing . . . to lessen, weaken, or avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by court of com-
petent jurisdiction” precluded the forum-selection clause); see also Linda S. Mullenix, 
Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual 
Personal Jurisdiction, 27 Tex. Int’l L.J. 323, 358 (1992) (describing the “widespread 
support for forum-selection clauses in the federal courts” such that challenges based 
upon The Bremen’s factors “have been largely unsuccessful”); Michael E. Solimine, 
Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 Cornell Int’l L.J. 51, 
51–52 (1992). 
38 Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 
1998); Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998); Allen v. 
Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 929 (4th Cir. 1996); Bonny v. Soc’y of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 
156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993); Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Co., 926 F.2d 865, 869 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
39 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985); 
accord 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009) (“[A] substantive 
waiver of federally protected civil rights will not be upheld . . . .”); Vimar Seguros, 515 
U.S. at 540. Because of the statutory requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006), and its state analogs, arbitration doctrine has evolved 
distinctly, culminating in this public-policy limitation upon enforcement. Yet its seem-
ingly coextensive scope with fundamental fairness may not merely be normatively 
preferred; it may be constitutionally required: to the extent that the Court’s funda-
mental fairness limitations upon procedural contracting are constitutionally derived, 
the FAA cannot override these limitations. 
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might not occur even though the uncertainty itself may be great 
enough to discourage pursuit of the claim.40 
While courts permit hybrid procedural terms41 and pure proce-
dural terms that regulate party conduct,42 the Supreme Court has 
not yet conclusively determined the enforceability of terms that 
regulate the courts directly.43 One might speculate that the Court 
will continue its broad embrace of private ordering, reasoning that 
greater customization of terms will yield an optimal balance of 
truth-seeking and cost as defined by the parties’ ex ante prefer-
 
40 See, e.g., PacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406–07 (2003) (enforcing 
the clause despite a limitation on punitive damages potentially precluding statutory 
treble damages); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90–91 (2000) 
(enforcing clause despite uncertainty about costs and fees of arbitration substantial 
enough to make pursuit of claim prohibitive); Vimar Seguros, 515 U.S. at 531–32, 541 
(enforcing a clause despite likelihood of lesser remedies under foreign law in violation 
of non-waivable statutory protection). Although challenges will continue to be made, 
the recent opinion in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion substantially cabins the ability of 
parties to invalidate an arbitration provision pre-arbitration pursuant to Section 2 of 
the FAA. 130 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011). As a result, effective challenges must either 
show that the agreement met the exceedingly high standard of effectively waiving the 
substantive right, or must be made post-arbitration under the statutorily limited bases 
of Section 10. 
41 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) (noting 
the frequency and enforceability of forum-selection agreements); The Bremen v. Za-
pata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1972) (enforcing a forum-selection term that 
incorporated choice-of-law selection); cf. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (2001) (providing for en-
forcement of choice-of-law clauses). 
42 See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975) 
(recognizing that parties may contract regarding attorneys’ fees); D.H. Overmyer Co. 
v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 184–86 (1972) (enforcing a cognovit note waiving notice 
and hearing); 7 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 15:12, at 264–
67 (4th ed. 1997) (stating that statutes of limitations generally cannot be waived en-
tirely but can be shortened); Noyes, supra note 2, at 607–08 (“Courts have enforced 
agreements that waive hearsay objections, objections to authenticity of documents, 
objections to qualifications of expert witness, and invocations of privileges.”); Debra 
T. Landis, Annotation, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Civil Cases, 92 
A.L.R. Fed. 688, 691 (2003) (noting the uniform enforceability of jury waivers in fed-
eral court).  
43 But see United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 & n.5 (1995) (noting in the 
criminal context that evidentiary rules designed to ensure trustworthiness of evidence 
are “waivable beyond any question” and thus should be subject to contract to facili-
tate “negotiations without any arbitrary limits on [the parties’] bargaining chips”); 
Williston, supra note 42, § 15:13, at 272 (“There is a growing tendency for the courts 
to uphold the right of the parties to prescribe certain rules of evidence . . . so long as it 
does not unduly interfere with the inherent power and right of the court to consider 
relevant evidence.”). 
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ences.44 But would the Court permit parties to commandeer judicial 
officers in this manner? The Court’s sole invalidation of a proce-
dural term suggests the Justices may not find the practice antitheti-
cal to the judicial role: although the Court narrowly held in Hall 
Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc. that the Federal Arbitration Act 
specifically preempted the modification of the standard of review 
in the courts, the Court expressly noted that under state law or 
common law parties may be able to modify the standard of judicial 
review.45 The Court then remanded the case for consideration of 
whether the contract could instead be enforced under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 16.46 
This survey of existing doctrine is not intended to contend that 
further restrictions on private ordering are impossible. To the con-
trary, the ability of parties to modify the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure is a particularly likely area of litigation, juxtaposing the 
Court’s embrace of uniformity47 with its strong support of private 
ordering of procedure.48 Rather, this discussion seeks to emphasize 
that these (some might say intuitive) restrictions do not yet exist—
underscoring the need for a systemic review of the existing scope of 
private ordering and the resulting normative implications. 
B. The Commoditization of Procedure 
Traditional civil procedure analysis has focused upon questions 
of which procedural rules create optimal results, however variously 
defined. The rise of procedural contracting creates a new set of in-
quiries that ask what range of rules should be permitted rather 
 
44 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 208; Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. 
Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1803, 1812 (1997); Scott & Triantis, supra note 13, at 857–
78. 
45 552 U.S. 576, 590–92 (2008); accord AT&T v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 
(2011) (noting, in discussing AAA rules authorizing judicial review of class certifica-
tion decisions, that under the FAA “parties may not contractually expand the grounds 
or nature of judicial review”). This suggestion that greater private ordering may now 
be more possible in litigation than arbitration—contrary to the original purposes of 
the FAA—is a stark illustration of the degree to which the courts’ view of procedural 
contracting has changed in the last century. 
46 Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 592. 
47 See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1444 (2010). 
48 See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 
(2010). 
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than focusing upon selection of the best universal default rule. The 
view embraced by the Supreme Court and traditional scholarship 
treats procedural contracts as a method for generating procedural 
efficiencies and increased certainty of process, resulting in broad 
enforcement of procedural terms. I argue that this view is too nar-
row, as it focuses upon the procedural effect of contracting while 
overlooking the potential gains from the use of substance-affecting 
or behavior-shaping terms. As parties already strategically employ 
procedure during the litigation process, it should not be surprising 
that parties would use procedural terms to maximize strategic ad-
vantage in the same manner, trading off differences in expected 
outcome from procedural modification just as substantive terms 
exploit differences in valuation. Yet the ability of parties to use 
procedure as a method of shifting parties’ obligations and primary-
activity behavior has remained “relatively unstudied.”49 
1. Bundled Elections Between Public Systems 
While applicable law and a forum must be selected in every dis-
pute, parties should engage in bargaining for procedure only if the 
benefits of the term outweigh the transaction costs.50 Certainty of 
obligation may itself provide an intrinsic benefit, but its value is not 
static. Instead, the benefit gained by certainty of obligation is in-
versely correlated with the degree of variation between the com-
peting procedural regimes. 
The degree of variance in outcome between competing systems 
has vastly expanded in the last century, dramatically increasing the 
potential gains derived from procedural contracting along both the 
traditional horizontal51 and newer vertical axes.52 As a result of the 
 
49 Chris William Sanchirico, A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof Burdens, 37 J. 
Legal Stud. 273, 273 (2008); accord Scott & Triantis, supra note 13, at 857. 
50 See Scott & Triantis, supra note 13, at 822–39 (discussing comparative front-end 
versus back-end costs of contracting). 
51 See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1593, 1612–14 (2008) (describing modern horizontal forum shopping). 
52 Compare Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463–64 (1965), with Conformity Act of 
1872, ch. 255, §§ 5, 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872); see also Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 
(1842). In passing the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 
Stat. 4, 4–5 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), Congress expressly 
recognized the importance of vertical forum election, expanding defendants’ ability to 
remove to federal court to avoid what Congress identified as over-enforcement of 
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Rehnquist Court’s strong enforcement of procedural terms, hori-
zontal selections as to forum and choice of law remain key strategic 
decisions because variations in state unconscionability law are in-
creasingly dispositive in determining the enforceability of proce-
dural terms.53 The Roberts Court’s rulings last Term further ex-
panded the effect vertical forum selection could have on the 
substantive outcome of cases: in a federal forum, class actions are 
presumptively available and a class action can proceed notwith-
standing a contrary state statute that would bar a class proceeding 
in a state forum.54 
But is this degree of variance sufficient to shift substantive out-
comes? The one-dimensional nature of ex post transfer and re-
moval limits the degree of expected variation between forums as 
compared with two-dimensional ex ante contracting. Even with this 
limitation, studies have found that successful removal or transfer 
can reduce the plaintiff’s likelihood of succeeding on the merits by 
fifty percent.55 Parties’ strategic ex post elections56 and willingness 
 
private rights of action by state courts. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Has the Erie Doc-
trine Been Repealed by Congress?, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1629, 1629 (2008); cf. Debra Lyn 
Bassett, The Defendant’s Obligation to Ensure Adequate Representation in Class 
Actions, 74 UMKC L. Rev. 511, 529 & n.111 (2006) (describing corporate lobbying 
for CAFA as prompted by the sentiment that federal courts are “less receptive” to 
class actions than state courts). 
53 Against this backdrop, states have adopted widely ranging unconscionability doc-
trines, with some states supporting the minimal federal restraints and others adopting 
a stance against perceived federal over-enforcement. See Bruhl, supra note 11, at 
1422. 
54 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 
(2010). In contrast, if parties elect arbitration, class actions are barred unless the par-
ties expressly contract for them. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010). 
55 In a recent study, plaintiffs prevailed in 71% of original diversity cases but in only 
34% of removed diversity cases; likewise, plaintiffs prevailed in 58% of all non-
transferred federal cases but in only 29% of transferred cases. See Clermont, supra 
note 19, at 1921, 1926–29; see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do 
Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and 
Removal Jurisdiction, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 581, 593 (1998) (reviewing potential con-
taminating variables but concluding that removal may have an even stronger effect 
than attorneys realize notwithstanding the high degree of existing forum shopping). 
56 See Erichson, supra note 51, at 1612–14 (describing plaintiffs’ shift from vertical 
forum shopping to horizontal forum shopping in the wake of defendants’ success in 
passing CAFA). 
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to invest tens or even hundreds of thousands in forum battles,57 in 
addition to the estimated $50 to $200 million spent by corporations 
lobbying for broader removal rights,58 suggests a mutual perception 
that forum affects outcomes. 
With these stakes, sophisticated parties are not merely contract-
ing for the certainty of any forum as the Supreme Court sug-
gested;59 instead, parties make these investments in the shadow of 
expected substantive effect to control which forum.60 Unsurpris-
ingly, emerging empirical evidence increasingly demonstrates that 
substantive outcomes drive not only ex post forum selection but 
also ex ante selections of hybrid terms. Professors Eisenberg and 
Miller have demonstrated that choice-of-law elections occur in vir-
tually all merger agreements, with the specific election of law hav-
ing a substantial correlation with the selection of forum and citi-
zenship.61 Controlling for these factors, parties’ selections often 
reflect preferences for a particular mutually preferred substantive 
law62 and for particular forums’ decisionmakers.63 For example, 
Delaware law and courts are often selected by public companies 
anticipating internal governance disputes, while New York law and 
courts are favored for external matters.64 In contrast to the poten-
tial for mutually beneficial selections of law and forum in the cor-
 
57 Andrew R. Sebok, International Tort and Insurance Law and Practice: What Has 
Become of Our World?, 24 Tort & Ins. L.J. 390, 392 (1989) (reporting that $25 million 
was spent litigating the forum in the Bhopal disaster). 
58 Genevieve G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Ac-
tion Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1793, 1804 n.53 (2009). 
59 See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991) (focusing upon 
the efficiency of selecting a single forum but not considering the possibility of a stra-
tegic election). 
60 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: 
An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1975, 
1981 (2006); see also Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency 
in Choice of Law, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1151, 1152–53 (2000). 
61 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 60, at 1981, 2011–12. 
62 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Em-
pirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Com-
panies’ Contracts, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1475, 1475–76 (2009). 
63 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 60, at 1982. 
64 See id.; Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 62, at 1475–76. 
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porate context, studies have suggested a uniformly one-sided selec-
tion of legal regimes favoring sellers in the consumer context.65 
Strategic election of law has traditionally led to competition 
among states to capture the market.66 In the procedural context, 
drafting parties’ comparisons of expected substantive outcomes 
across arbitral forums led to charges of institutional capture—that 
arbitral institutions were competing to offer the best forum to re-
peat players67 and creating asymmetries disadvantageous to one-
shot litigants.68 Disaggregating the role of judges in deciding indi-
vidual cases from the creation of procedural rules demonstrates 
that even absent judicial capture, a market for procedure—and the 
risk of institutional capture—can persist at the rule-maker level. As 
parties have commoditized the election between public systems, 
the collective motivation for states to create favorable procedural 
rules has resulted in the nascent development of a market for pro-
cedure at the institutional level, analogous to the market for corpo-
rate substantive law.69 It does not seem unreasonable to speculate 
that as the market becomes increasingly sophisticated, forums will 
 
65 Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 7, at 999 (reporting that forum and choice-of-
law provisions appeared in only thirty-two percent and forty percent of consumer 
contracts, respectively, but always favored the seller). 
66 For example, commoditization of substantive law led to competition among 
states—most notably between New York and Delaware—to win the battle for incor-
poration. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable 
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1443, 1452 
(1992). The same trend occurred with respect to usury laws in the 1980s and 1990s. 
See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doc-
trine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 518, 552 
(2004). 
67 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total 
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 410–412 (2005) (discuss-
ing repeat-player leverage in the context of institutions’ class arbitration policies). 
68 See, e.g., Developments in the Law–Access to Courts, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1151, 
1174–75 (2009) (detailing concern with repeat-player bias). 
69 See, e.g., Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, The Law Market 3–5 (2009); 
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 60, at 1980 (“States engage in competition in the areas 
of choice of law and choice of forum that is analogous, in important respects, to the 
competition for corporate charters.”); Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competi-
tion in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and 
the Race to the Bottom, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1381, 1383–84 (2008) (describing the 
law-as-commodity trend with respect to substantive law); Geoffrey P. Miller & Theo-
dore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2073, 2073–74 (2009) 
(detailing the modifications New York has made to compete for parties to commer-
cial contracts to select New York’s law and courts). 
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specialize—attempting to attract corporate operations, plaintiffs’ 
counsel, or business-to-business litigation—with a resulting polari-
zation of rules. Indeed, the innovation of the class-action waiver 
prompted such a response, with states codifying rules permitting or 
barring class-action waivers and further increasing the value gener-
ated by strategic forum shopping.70 The rise of procedural private 
ordering is thus likely to affect not only those parties who engage 
in procedural contracting but also to shape the rules of procedure 
available to all litigants.71 
The discussion to this point has reflected a traditional notion of 
“bundled forum selection.” Yet, as I argue in the next Subsection, 
parties are beginning to customize aspects of procedure within a 
system, rather than simply electing between systems. To the extent 
that parties are able to unbundle procedure—electing a forum 
based upon its decisionmakers and then imposing customized 
rules—we should anticipate a shift in both the criteria for selection 
and the resulting market behavior of competing jurisdictions. In an 
unbundled system, we should not anticipate that parties will con-
tinue to select a forum based upon the default rules but instead 
upon the degree of customization permitted. This trend is already 
apparent with respect to the comparatively well-developed legal 
regime governing arbitration, as choice-of-law clauses are negoti-
ated in the shadow of substantial state-by-state variations in the en-
forceability of the arbitration.72 As litigation increasingly mirrors 
arbitration, there is little reason not to expect the same trend. 
Against the backdrop of the existing “unconscionability game” 
unfolding among jurisdictions,73 the effect upon public control of 
 
70 Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 70C-3-104, 70C-4-105 (2009) (codifying enforceabil-
ity of class-action waivers in arbitration), with N.M. Stat. §§ 44-7A-1(b)(4)(f), 44-7A-5 
(2010) (establishing that class-action waivers in arbitration clauses are unenforceable 
and voidable). 
71 To the extent that one expects an asymmetry in the market—for example, forums 
attempting to attract corporate parties drafting provisions in contemplation of de-
fending litigation—the rules of procedure could resultantly become asymmetric, 
yielding secondary effects in the ex post election of procedure. 
72 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight From Arbitration: An 
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held 
Companies, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 335, 343–44, 358–59 (2007) (finding that twenty-four 
percent of contracts selecting the law of an arbitration-friendly state elected arbitra-
tion while only four percent of contracts selecting an arbitration-hostile state do so). 
73 See Bruhl, supra note 11, at 1421–22. 
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private ordering is substantial: if only one forum available to the 
parties permits unbundling, the parties can elect it and opt into an 
unbundled regime. This rule would give the promulgating state a 
substantial advantage in the market for procedure as each set of 
parties would be able to create its own preferred rules74 free of the 
constraints of due process,75 rather than selecting the closest match 
among prefabricated defaults. Given this preference, forum shop-
ping based upon degree of procedural private ordering is likely in 
coming years and may trigger a race to private ordering in some 
states, with others holding the provisions void as unconscionable or 
against public policy to prevent intrusions upon public ordering.76 
2. Unbundling Procedure 
Procedural contracting offers an example of what I term an “un-
bundled” procedural regime in litigation, in which parties no 
longer select between complete sets of procedure and forum but 
instead bargain over individual procedural terms. Through unbun-
dling, parties can adjust individual procedural rights based upon ex 
ante preferences, with resultant effects on the cost of enforcement 
of substantive rights, the likelihood of liability, and expected dam-
ages or available remedies—thereby privately adjusting the level of 
deterrence for each substantive term. In contrast to substantive 
terms ordinarily remedied by damages, procedural terms are 
remedied by specific performance, further broadening the array of 
options available to contracting parties in obtaining optimal terms 
and precluding subsequent defection—or efficient breach.77 
 
74 This flexibility is a distinct advantage in the market for procedure, as commercial 
contracts show a sustained and repeated ex ante desire for streamlined, low-cost pro-
cedure. See infra Subsection I.B.2.a. Moreover, if corporate parties have dispropor-
tionate control over procedural terms in contracts with individuals, then this baseline 
degree of preference for unbundled procedure could be increased by an ability to use 
procedural terms to affect substantive outcomes. See infra Subsection I.B.2.b; Section 
II.B. 
75 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (discussing variability of 
due process requirements); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) 
(noting waivability of civil due process). 
76 For a discussion of the similar trend in state law in response to federal enforce-
ment of arbitration provisions, see Bruhl, supra note 11, at 1443–64. 
77 See Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 13, at 1092. 
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a. Dimensions of Optimization 
Procedural scholars have traditionally assumed that 
“[c]ontractual provisions [limiting discovery] are likely to be found 
only when there is inequality of bargaining power, and are hardly 
an appropriate means for disregarding rules of court devised to 
serve the public interest.”78 Contrary to this assumption, sophisti-
cated commercial parties regularly modify the rules of civil proce-
dure and evidence to improve substantive outcomes, whether 
through greater efficiency or greater accuracy. 
Viewed from an efficiency standpoint, it is unsurprising that par-
ties will contract toward minimizing litigation costs to prevent 
transfers of wealth to third parties.79 Oftentimes these terms gener-
ate direct cost savings for both parties. Even where the benefit is 
one-sided or imposes a cost upon the other party—as with an 
agreement to limit document preservation obligations—the term 
should not be dismissed as reflective of bargaining power inequal-
ity. Rather, the parties can bargain for the allocation of the joint 
cost savings through other terms—for example, reducing the price 
of the product. 
More interesting is the potential use of procedural terms as a so-
phisticated mechanism for tailoring or reinforcing the parties’ sub-
stantive obligations. It is not unusual for parties to contract for 
substantive terms that more precisely assess compliance with their 
contractual obligations, even where these terms will increase litiga-
tion costs.80 Generally, these terms are appropriately employed 
where the parties’ valuation of improved accuracy exceeds the cost 
 
78 8 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2005, at 52 (3d ed. 
2010). 
79 See Developments in the Law, supra note 68, at 1170–71 (noting cost savings as a 
primary driver of arbitration’s popularity). 
80 For discussion of the use of substantive terms that require more expensive eviden-
tiary methods or the replacement of a rule with a standard, see Albert Choi & George 
Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. Legal Stud. 
503, 504–09, 523–25 (2008) (discussing the election of more precise substantive obliga-
tions that entail higher verification or litigation costs, using the examples of expert 
testimony and subjective state of mind testimony); Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Op-
timal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 150, 150–63 (1995); Louis Kap-
low & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & Econ. 1, 
1–15 (1994) (noting the problem of over-deterrence and excessive investment). 
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of litigation.81 Procedural unbundling opens the door to a new 
realm of substance-reinforcing or substance-adjusting obligations. 
With respect to substance-reinforcing provisions, parties may in-
crease procedural protections to obtain a greater degree of accu-
racy in outcome.82 In contrast, substance-adjusting obligations are 
not intended to increase accuracy but instead to shift how the par-
ties’ obligations are defined.83 At the extreme, parties may entirely 
abandon the pursuit of an accurate determination of their substan-
tive obligations by using procedural terms to bar a claim84 or de-
fense.85 
To the extent parties seek to optimize procedure, “almost limit-
less” methods of modification are available.86 It is nevertheless use-
ful to catalogue briefly the most common provisions within the ex-
isting scope of private ordering before turning to the strategic use 
of these terms. With respect to filing and pleading, parties do not 
merely select particular forums and waive objections to jurisdic-
tion.87 They instead modify the means, method, timing, and re-
quirements of filing through waiver of particular claims or substan-
tive defenses,88 waiver of procedural defenses such as statutes of 
limitations89 or laches,90 and—in the extreme case of cognovit 
notes—waiver of the right to notice and a hearing.91 At the discov-
ery phase, contracts typically limit rather than expand discovery,92 
 
81 In the substantive law context, these terms may have the benefit of increasing de-
terrence where the increased accuracy enhances the ex ante differential in expected 
liability as between the comparative states of compliance and non-compliance for the 
prospective defendant notwithstanding the additional costs. 
82 For example, a provision decreasing the level of deference provided during appel-
late review might be within this category. 
83 For example, a provision specifying the type of evidence admissible with respect 
to a breach of contract action will de facto define the substance of the obligation. 
84 See supra text accompanying note 38. 
85 See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187–88 (1972) (holding that 
delivery of a cognovit note waived rights to pre-judgment notice and hearing). 
86 Moffitt, supra note 12, at 465. 
87 See supra Subsection I.B.1. 
88 See Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 7, at 999 (reporting that forty-nine percent 
of consumer contracts surveyed disclaimed implied warranties). 
89 Id. (noting that six percent of contracts surveyed modified the statute of limita-
tions in favor of the seller). 
90 See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 14, at 7. 
91 See, e.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972). 
92 See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 14, at 10. 
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using the shared ex ante preference for minimized litigation costs 
to prevent ex post defection and escalation of resource invest-
ment.93 
Parties are also contracting to modify the decision-making proc-
ess during motion practice and trial by, for instance, waiving the 
right to jury trial,94 modifying the rules of discovery,95 and shifting 
the burden of proof in either direction.96 While class-action waiver 
provisions commonly appeared in consumer arbitration agree-
ments prior to Stolt-Nielsen,97 class-action waivers have almost 
never been employed in litigation.98 Finally, parties are also at-
tempting to contract to modify appellate rights.99 
In addition to indirectly manipulating the cost and expected 
judgment in litigation, parties are directly modifying these vari-
ables through remedies provisions. One class of provisions limits 
remedies, as with damages caps, waivers, or clauses limiting plain-
 
93 Cf. Hay, supra note 44, at 1811–12; Steven Seidenberg, International Arbitration 
Loses Its Grip: Are U.S. Lawyers to Blame?, 96 A.B.A. J. 50, 51 (2010) (citing survey 
results showing that in 2006 only eleven percent of in-house counsel preferred litiga-
tion over arbitration for international disputes but by 2008 the percentage rose to 
forty-one percent because of increasing discovery and extended motion practice mir-
roring American litigation). While evidentiary shifts may asymmetrically shift the 
facts presented, they do not necessarily do so. See Edward Brunet et al., Arbitration 
Law in America: A Critical Assessment 131 (2006). 
94 See infra Subsection I.B.2.b. 
95 Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 14, at 10; Noyes, supra note 2, at 595–612; Taylor 
& Cliffe, supra note 13, at 1086. 
96 Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 13, at 1086. While this shifting is particularly useful 
with respect to contractual duties, it may also be used to adjust the burden upon the 
parties in enforcing statutory rights. Absent limitations on private ordering, a party 
could, for example, contract around the burden-shifting framework of employment 
discrimination claims or require an express statement of discriminatory intent before 
a guilty verdict could be returned. Such modifications could fundamentally alter the 
statutory protections provided by Title VII. 
97 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
98 See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s 
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-
consumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871, 884–86 (2008) (finding that eighty 
percent of consumer contracts with arbitration provisions included a class-action 
waiver while no consumer contract subject to litigation included such a term). 
99 See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008); Kapeliuk & 
Klement, supra note 14, at 12. 
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tiffs to declaratory or injunctive relief.100 A second class of provi-
sions adjusts the conditions surrounding injunctive relief by, for 
example, modifying the obligation to post a bond or consenting to 
the issuance of a preliminary injunction.101 A third class of provi-
sions modifies the default rule regarding attorneys’ fees, increasing 
the stakes of litigation by, for example, adopting the English rule 
granting fees and costs to the prevailing party or creating an 
asymmetric arrangement allowing only one party to recover fees if 
it prevails.102 
Careful drafting in light of anticipated liability risks, preferred 
enforcement levels, and cost-to-accuracy ratio or risk profile, as 
well as the degree to which the term will serve these goals, has 
generated substantial variation in the use of particular provisions 
across contracts.103 Two key observations arise. First, contracts 
scholars have long debated the value of permitting parties to cus-
tomize liability; for example, contracting to shift from unlimited to 
limited liability for low-valuation buyers in exchange for pricing 
discounts or other concessions and simultaneously permitting high-
valuation buyers to contract for increased levels of precaution at 
higher prices.104 The rise of unbundled procedure extends this prin-
ciple to the often-correlated relationship between accuracy and 
cost. Consider, for example, the right to appeal. For low-value 
 
100 See Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 7, at 999 (reporting that twenty-two per-
cent of contracts surveyed placed a cap on damages); see also Kapeliuk & Klement, 
supra note 14, at 8. 
101 See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 14, at 9 (discussing asymmetric injunctive 
provisions). 
102 Id. at 8. One particularly egregious provision, provided in a medical consent form, 
required the patient to pay the doctor’s hourly fee for each hour he spent preparing to 
testify and at the arbitration (even if he was found guilty of malpractice) if the patient 
received less than half of her original damages request—thereby increasing the poten-
tial cost of pursuing her claim and providing a strong incentive to minimize the dam-
ages sought to reduce this risk of payout. See Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 359–60 
(Utah 1996). 
103 For example, while arbitration provisions are common in construction contracts 
because of the ability to select an expert as the decisionmaker or in international dis-
putes where the parties prefer the enforceability of the New York Convention to the 
less-certain enforcement profile of litigation awards, corporations generally prefer 
litigation to arbitration. 
104 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 101–02 (1989); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to 
Reveal Information, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1615, 1620–23 (1999). 
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claims, parties may prefer to contract ex ante to remove the right 
to appeal and bear the risk of an erroneous verdict, as essentially 
occurs in the default form of arbitration.105 For high-value claims, 
however, parties are unwilling to accept even a low risk of catas-
trophic error and thus have shifted to litigation to ensure robust 
appellate rights.106 This tradeoff can also be used to manipulate 
asymmetries: for instance, where the defendant has a high risk tol-
erance due to an ability to aggregate losses across cases and the 
plaintiff cannot, needing the damages to cover medical expenses or 
lost wages. The defendant is thus able to benefit from the reduc-
tion in litigation costs but may choose to use this provision to ex-
tract a blackmail settlement from a plaintiff willing to take a lower 
settlement to avoid a loss at trial. As a result, the decreased delta 
between compliance states due to both the heightened risk of error 
and the probability of extracting a blackmail settlement may de-
crease deterrence. To the extent that the plaintiff does not antici-
pate the risk asymmetry, this may also facilitate market failure. 
Second, in each contract, terms may be used as a method for 
modifying party behavior ex ante rather than simply as a means of 
enhancing the efficiency or accuracy of truth-finding.107 Again, 
asymmetries may be used to substantially affect outcome.108 Con-
sider an agreement to freely provide certain information to the 
plaintiff without the need for discovery requests in exchange for a 
waiver of broad discovery. While such a provision facially aids the 
plaintiff, it can functionally bar claims that require aggregate 
data—particularly if combined with a class-action bar. For exam-
ple, disparate-impact discrimination claims, toxic-tort claims, and 
product-liability claims for pharmaceutical as well as consumer 
products may turn upon the ability to demonstrate that other indi-
viduals suffered the same harm. Absent special factors such as geo-
graphic proximity, identifiability of injured parties, social connect-
 
105 See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008). Before Hall Street, 
provisions modifying the standard of review in arbitration were common enough that 
eight circuits had confronted the issue, including the Ninth Circuit, which reviewed 
the issue en banc. Id. at 583 n.5 (describing circuit split). 
106 See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 157, 179 (2006).  
107 See Sanchirico, supra note 49, at 276–78. 
108 See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 949, 954 (2000). 
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edness, or exceedingly high damages, parties are unlikely to obtain 
the high levels of cooperation from other victims necessary to sub-
stitute for discovery. If low participation rates prevail, the small 
number of claims may result in a (potentially mistaken) belief that 
the harms suffered are within the normal baseline levels projected 
for society at large and thus are not evidence of a particular harm 
caused by the defendant’s operations. Meaningful recovery would 
thus require discovery available only through a public enforcement 
action in which the discovery limit would be inapplicable109—
underscoring the possibility that procedural private ordering will 
shift the burden of enforcement to public agencies. 
Substantial room for innovation remains. For example, although 
parties commonly contract for fee-shifting provisions to disincen-
tivize nuisance litigation or defenses, contracts have not yet begun 
to shift discovery costs even though these costs can be so burden-
some to a defendant as to encourage nuisance-value settlements to 
avoid the costs of data and document preservation.110 So too, par-
ties could contract in advance for the designation of a joint expert 
witness whose report would not be challenged by either side in 
court—not only decreasing direct expert witness costs but provid-
ing a strong incentive toward early settlement once the report is-
sues. Nonetheless, parties are frequently unwilling to cede this de-
gree of ex post control over the outcome despite the litigation cost 
benefit. This presumed preference to pay a litigation cost premium 
across all cases to preserve the right to appeal an erroneous judg-
ment is mirrored in the class arbitration context, as—
notwithstanding the general preference to resolve single-plaintiff 
employment disputes in arbitration—corporations prefer class liti-
gation to class arbitration because of the magnified risk of an ad-
verse class arbitration award with no meaningful appellate rights.111 
 
109 Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 287–88, 295–97 (2002) (holding that an 
employee’s agreement to arbitrate did not bar public action on his behalf or the pur-
suit of victim-specific relief but that victim-specific defenses would be valid defenses 
to a public-enforcement action). 
110 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–59 (2007). 
111 For a similar view, see Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 106, at 179. 
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b. The Procedural-Contracting Dichotomy 
Emerging evidence suggests a strong variation between com-
mercial provisions and form consumer or employment provisions 
with respect to the frequency of many terms.112 Given the presence 
of variation in mutually bargained for commercial terms that re-
flect a particular weighing of the benefit of the contract term 
against its cost, I am reticent to embrace the argument advanced by 
many that the mere existence of disparities is proof of exploitive 
practices by the drafting corporation.113 The correlation here may 
instead reflect mutual assessments that the particular term is 
unlikely to be relevant or to shift behavior to a degree sufficient to 
justify the transaction cost, or an inability of the parties to agree 
upon a pricing term where the term has an asymmetric effect on 
the parties’ anticipated claims or defenses. Where the terms asym-
metrically favor one party—as preliminary research suggests cer-
tain consumer provisions do114—it may reflect a homogeneous 
market determination as to the optimal term offset by benefits in 
pricing or other terms. While I resist the conclusion that all proce-
dural terms in consumer and employment contracts are inefficient, 
neither do I—for the reasons articulated in the next Part—believe 
the market is universally functioning. 
Despite the plethora of highly individualized factors driving the 
use of a particular term in a particular contract, evidence does exist 
for a broader generalization: commercial contracts often modify 
default procedures through downward departures minimizing pro-
cedure but simultaneously enhancing liability provisions, shifting 
 
112 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Mandatory 
Arbitration for Customers but Not for Peers: A Study of Arbitration Clauses in Con-
sumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 92 Judicature 118 (2008). For example, while 
more than seventy-five percent of consumer contracts and over ninety percent of em-
ployment contracts contain mandatory arbitration provisions, fewer than six percent 
of commercial agreements provide for arbitration. Id. at 121. Likewise, nearly eighty 
percent of consumer contracts and over ninety percent of employment contracts in-
clude a jury-trial waiver, in contrast with thirty percent of commercial contracts. Id. at 
122. Surprisingly, while more than eighty percent of consumer contracts and less than 
thirty percent of commercial agreements waived class-action rights, none of the em-
ployment agreements did so. Id. at 121. 
113 See, e.g., id. at 118 (summarizing the arguments of opponents of mandatory arbi-
tration clauses). 
114 Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 7, at 999. 
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the burden toward the defendant.115 In contrast, consumer and em-
ployment provisions typically decrease procedure and either make 
no modification to the default liability rules or shift liability in fa-
vor of the defendant.116 The most sophisticated agreements go fur-
ther, tailoring the provisions to diminish rights likely to be exer-
cised by the individual while providing the default rules or 
enhanced rights with respect to claims the drafting corporation will 
be likely to raise.117 
The example of jury-trial waivers suggests that this dichotomy 
may not reflect optimal variance as between these categories of 
contracts and may instead reflect market failure as to certain 
terms.118 Jury-trial waivers offer some benefits across all types of 
litigation by decreasing litigation costs119 and, for defendants, re-
ducing the risk of an extremely large punitive damages award.120 
 
115 See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 14, at 7–9; Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) De-
fense of Strict Liability in Contract, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1381, 1394–96 (2009) (catalog-
ing direct and indirect procedural methods by which commercial parties routinely 
contract for strict liability). 
116 See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 14, at 7–9; cf. Scott, supra note 115, at 1395–
96 (noting that strict liability is largely used between commercially sophisticated par-
ties but assuming that claims for strict liability would have “less force” when applied 
to unsophisticated parties). 
117 See, e.g., Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex. App. 
1996) (per curiam) (“If employed, I agree that all claims relating to my employment, 
other than worker’s compensation claims or claims arising under a non-compete 
agreement, shall be settled exclusively by expedited arbitration, without discovery.”); 
see also Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 98, at 888 (discussing one-sided pro-
visions); Reuben, supra note 108, at 954 & n.8 (2000) (discussing explicitly and implic-
itly one-sided provisions disadvantaging consumers); Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer 
Trials, 2006 J. Disp. Resol. 181, 181 (2006) (describing the “nightmare” of ex ante 
jury-trial waivers). 
118 Under existing federal doctrine, jury-trial waivers are broadly enforceable be-
cause the waivers do not preclude the bringing of a claim or defense, notwithstanding 
the apparent substantial effect upon compensation and, likely, deterrence. See Noyes, 
supra note 2, at 604 n.107. 
119 Christian N. Elloie, Are Pre-Dispute Jury Trial Waivers a Bargain for Employers 
Over Arbitration? It Depends on the Employee, 76 Def. Couns. J. 91, 96 (2009) (not-
ing that seventy-eight percent of bench trial cases have reached final judgment within 
two years of filing compared to only fifty-seven percent of jury-trial cases and report-
ing that bench trials last an average of 1.9 days compared with 4.3 days for jury trials). 
120 Of the fifty-three largest punitive awards between 1985 and 2002—those in excess 
of $100 million—fifty-two were awarded by juries. Id. at 95. But see Theodore 
Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 743, 779 (2002) (discussing results showing similar relationship between 
compensatory and punitive damages awards whether issued by juries or judges). 
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But preliminary studies suggest that with respect to certain types of 
claims, including employment discrimination, systematic biases oc-
cur between bench and jury trials; for these claims, a jury-trial 
waiver can reduce projected liability by up to ninety percent.121 For 
the corporation, while there is a moderate benefit across all dis-
putes of avoiding the heightened litigation costs of jury trials, the 
benefit of a waiver from an individual, particularly in the con-
sumer, employment, and securities contexts, is often particularly 
high. But, if the market is functioning, the ex ante payments for 
consumer and employee waivers should be equivalent to the indi-
vidual’s pro rata share of the differential in substantive outcome. 
Alternatively stated, because the relative corporate preference is a 
reflection not of efficiency gains but instead a reallocation of dam-
ages, accurate pricing should diminish this preference. As a result, 
the corporation should prefer these waivers at similar frequency in 
individual and commercial contracts. Instead, ninety percent of 
employment contracts and nearly eighty percent of consumer con-
tracts contain jury-trial waivers, compared with thirty percent of 
non-consumer/non-employment contracts122—suggesting possible 
market failure with respect to pricing.123 
As the example of jury-trial waivers illustrates, procedural terms 
can profoundly affect both the defendant’s ex ante projection of 
gross litigation costs and damages and the plaintiff’s net recovery. 
To the extent that modifications adjust the deterrent value of the 
substantive law, one might posit that it is important to know 
whether the adjustment appropriately avoids over-deterrence (due, 
for example, to uncertainty or strategic ex post decisionmaking by 
plaintiffs) or instead creates under-deterrence as compared with 
the legislative aims. This determination would seem to be highly 
individualized, requiring an attempt to infer the hypothetical intent 
of a diverse group of legislators with respect to the effect of the 
 
121 While there is not a significant divergence in outcomes before juries and judges in 
some employment disputes, discrimination claims yield a 47.6% success rate for jury-
trial plaintiffs compared with only 26% in bench trials—nearly doubling the expected 
liability for the employer. Elloie, supra note 119, at 95. Successful plaintiffs received a 
median award of $218,000 from juries compared with $40,000 in bench trials. Id. at 96. 
Thus, the projected liability in a jury trial is $103,768 compared with $10,400 for a 
bench trial. 
122 Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 112, at 122. 
123 See infra Section II.B. 
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particular contractual modification given the facts of the particular 
case. Assuming a disparity arises, it presents the further question of 
whose interest should prevail where the public and private interests 
are in conflict. This inquiry in turn implicates the ongoing debate 
as to whether the quality of consent matters beyond the minimal 
requirements of contract formation. Given these divergent condi-
tions, how can a system be created that balances these competing 
interests in a normatively preferred pattern without creating the ex 
ante uncertainty and ex post investment of resources inherent to 
subjective determinations? The next Part turns to the threshold ex-
amination of the concerns and resulting factors that might reflect 
our normative enforcement preferences respecting this public-
private conflict. 
II. A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR EX ANTE PROCEDURAL 
CONTRACTS 
The existing doctrinal structure places only minimal restrictions 
upon parties’ modification of the litigation process and, more 
broadly, their use of procedural innovation to adjust substantive 
outcomes. The question of which of these alterations are norma-
tively desirable raises fundamental questions about the role of pri-
vate litigation, predominantly derived from the inherent dual pub-
lic-private role of private rights of action and courts more 
generally.124 Civil procedure’s central inquiry has long focused upon 
developing a set of rules providing the optimal balance of cost and 
accuracy against a background of (private) due process rights.125 
The rise of procedural private ordering inverts the traditional 
analysis by instead asking to what extent private ordering should 
be restrained to protect the public interest. 
Yet, these questions have remained obscured in both doctrine 
and scholarship by the dichotomy between commercial parties en-
gaged in sophisticated, value-maximizing bargains and the use of 
procedural fine print to prevent employees from vindicating their 
claims or consumers from challenging creditors’ alleged balances 
 
124 Cf. Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that 
the enforcement of procedural terms “is a matter of contract, not an issue of [civil 
procedure]”). 
125 See Resnik, supra note 13, at 596 & n.4. 
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due. While scholars frequently draw upon these extremes in com-
menting on the relative advantages and disadvantages of private 
ordering, the basis (if any) for viewing procedural terms as more 
problematic than substantive contract terms remains under-
theorized. As a result, the creation of a legal doctrine that can dis-
tinguish between these categories in enforcing procedural terms 
has proven elusive. By carefully explicating the distinctions be-
tween bargained-for commercial contracts and form consumer and 
employment contracts, this Part reveals the sources of the intuitive 
distinction, allowing development of a more normatively accurate 
doctrinal structure. This Part then turns to the more fundamental 
assessment of the public-private tension in procedural private or-
dering with respect to both procedural and substantive interests. 
A. The Procedural-Contracting Dichotomy:  
An Economic Explanation 
The enforcement of form consumer contracts has long divided 
the world into those who believe market functioning inures to the 
benefit of the consumer through lower prices obtained through 
tradeoffs in non-salient terms and those who believe sophisticated 
corporations exploit information asymmetries and erroneous deci-
sional heuristics. This Part analyzes procedural contracts through 
an economic lens, concluding that unique features of procedural 
contracts can heighten the risk of error in form consumer and em-
ployment contracts as compared with bargained-for commercial 
contracts. As a result, as enforcement of procedural terms becomes 
increasingly certain, one should expect a shift by sophisticated cor-
porations from using substantive terms to using procedural terms. 
This is not to say all contracts will include exploitive procedural 
terms. Drafting parties should include procedural terms only where 
these terms are expected to generate a greater net benefit to the 
drafter than alternative contract structures, such as a direct sub-
stantive waiver, would yield. The rise of procedural contracting 
thus provides a new, additional mechanism for the subset of sophis-
ticated market actors seeking to exploit consumer mistakes and er-
rors. 
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1. Commercial Transactions 
In the classic commercial contract, parties retain counsel to ne-
gotiate non-salient terms and formalize the agreement; critically, 
the cost of bargaining over the proposed procedural terms is there-
fore roughly equal as between the parties. Depending upon the de-
gree of complexity of the terms, this bargaining can add to the 
transaction costs or it can reduce transaction costs by providing 
additional dimensions for trade-offs, facilitating negotiation. 
Where parties expect that joint gains can be realized by customized 
procedure—for example, by reducing litigation costs through 
streamlined procedures, reducing nuisance claims or defenses, or 
improving accuracy of the liability determination—they should 
modify the default procedures.126 The particular procedural provi-
sions agreed upon should reflect the parties’ differing assumptions 
about the likelihood and type of dispute that will arise, expecta-
tions about the probable course of discovery and strategic maneu-
vering within litigation, and resulting preference for trading these 
preferred procedural terms against substantive terms during the 
course of the litigation. 
Despite a resulting tendency toward framing restrictions upon 
private ordering of procedure in relation to this commercial/non-
commercial divide,127 a careful analysis of bargaining conditions 
suggests this is a useful but imprecise heuristic. In many corporate 
transactions, one party presents form terms; these may be inte-
grated terms presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or simply a 
starting point for negotiations.128 The presentation of form terms 
 
126 For an economic analysis in the context of arbitration provisions, see Steven 
Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. Legal Stud. 1, 
2–3 (1995). 
127 See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009) 
(proposing to render pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable against con-
sumers, employees, franchisees, and civil-rights plaintiffs). 
128 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Un-
conscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1203 (2003) (noting that the use of form 
terms “has increased in the intervening decades” such that “nearly all commercial and 
consumer sales contracts are form driven”); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Con-
tracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 529 (1971) 
(estimating that more than ninety-nine percent of contracts are based upon form 
terms). 
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does not itself create the potential for market failure;129 rather, the 
threat in corporate transactions is largely limited to those circum-
stances in which one party is effectively unable to bargain for terms 
and must accept the deal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Uniformity 
of terms presents large corporations with scale efficiencies, while 
individualized terms add costs not only in drafting but also in en-
forcement. Although the bargain is for procedural terms rather 
than price, the bargaining dynamic and competitive response paral-
lel the antitrust model of price-takers and price-setters: while these 
companies may have in-house counsel able to review the provision 
at almost no cost and conclude that the term is unfavorable, the 
price (or procedural term) setter may insist that the term is pre-
sented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, leaving the company to accept 
or reject the market term. Where the entire market has settled on a 
sub-optimal term, the company may thus knowingly agree to the 
term because the benefits of the contract are superior to the alter-
native of not obtaining the good from any source. The next Section 
considers the circumstances that may cause markets to settle upon 
sub-optimal terms. 
2. Form Contracts with Individuals 
In Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, the Supreme Court abandoned 
the traditionally assumed distinction between the use of procedural 
terms in commercially bargained contracts and form agreements 
entered into by consumers on a theory of market functioning.130 
Many have chastised this transition, arguing that consumers and 
employees view themselves as unable to bargain and thus agree to 
whatever provisions are included in the contract. This critique is no 
different than that offered in the voluminous literature debating 
the merits of form contracts with individuals more generally: the 
same features that would impair the procedural term would impair 
a substantive waiver. Indeed, to the extent individuals fail to read 
certain types of contracts, corporations may prefer a direct sub-
 
129 Although the party initially presenting the terms may benefit from some scale ef-
ficiencies, the opposing party may overcome any substantial differential in informa-
tion costs relating to the procedural terms by presenting its own counterproposal on 
procedural terms. Each party will then be required to bear the costs of assessing and 
bargaining over each procedural term of both proposals. 
130 499 U.S. 585, 585–86 (1991). 
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stantive waiver of rights to indirectly limiting the rights through 
procedural terms. 
My goal is not to recapitulate this literature but instead to ex-
plore the unique consequences of applying its key tenets to proce-
dural terms, asking whether the case for enforcement is stronger or 
weaker as contrasted with form substantive terms. I focus upon 
market functioning not because it is the only mechanism for weigh-
ing the validity of procedural terms but because I seek to engage 
the Court on the terms it has selected.131 This analysis identifies the 
key factors that increase information asymmetries and bargaining 
power imbalances in form procedural contracts, making the case 
for enforcement weaker than the standard case for substantive 
terms. More broadly, I argue that with this understanding, the 
natural functioning of markets is able to explain the dichotomy in 
the use of procedural terms described in the preceding Part—as 
well as the failure of the market to self-correct. 
Non-Salience of Form Procedural Terms: Asymmetries and Ra-
tional Risk Taking. The prototypical individual contract is based 
upon boilerplate terms even if terms like price or election of cer-
tain features remain open to bargaining or customization.132 The 
drafting party thus makes a once-for-all investment in the informa-
tion costs related to analyzing competing procedural terms, while 
the non-drafting party typically bears the full information costs as 
transaction costs of the single transaction. Drafting parties may fur-
ther increase search and opportunity costs by withholding these 
terms until the sale has been completed133—a strategy the Supreme 
Court permitted in Carnival Cruise Lines.134 Moreover, employ-
ment and consumer contracts increasingly permit unilateral modi-
fication of terms after formation, which can multiply these infor-
 
131 For this purpose, I temporarily set aside questions of deontological or distributive 
justice before returning to them in Sections II.B and C. 
132 See Korobkin, supra note 128, at 1203–04. 
133 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse 
for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. Legal Stud. 309, 333 
(2009) (recognizing the frequency of post-sale terms but concluding that pro-seller 
bias is not stronger than it is for terms disclosed in advance of sale). 
134 See Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 585. 
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mation costs.135 Non-drafting parties therefore rationally opt not to 
bear these information costs where the costs exceed the expected 
variability between potential contract terms.136 While the non-
drafting consumer may not have information related to the ex-
pected liability, if the projected liability exceeded the product’s 
price, the company would be insolvent. Thus, the variation possi-
ble, even where the term reduces a claim from maximum liability 
to zero liability, should not exceed the purchase price. In an age 
where an hour of attorneys’ fees exceeds the price of many con-
sumer products, consumers rationally elect to bear the risk of not 
investigating the terms.137 Because the individual cannot distinguish 
between the default and proposed terms, procedural terms in form 
contracts are often non-salient to the recipient.138 The behavioralist 
literature adds further support to the claim that procedural terms 
are frequently non-salient.139 
 
135 See Horton, supra note 11, at 606 (discussing litigation in which AT&T had modi-
fied procedural terms governing litigation “so often . . . that even its own lawyers did 
not know which terms applied”). 
136 The consumer’s rational decision not to bear the costs of becoming informed 
about important risks is contrary to the baseline expectation of many scholars that 
individuals will bear the costs of becoming informed with respect to substantive provi-
sions and then act upon this information. See, e.g., Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 15, 
at 1391. 
137 Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Econom-
ics Meets the Real World, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 583, 585 (1990). Recognizing the powerful 
effect of non-negotiated form terms, under some states’ contract laws “[a]n agreement 
or any portion thereof is procedurally unconscionable if ‘the weaker party is pre-
sented the clause and told to “take it or leave it” without the opportunity for mean-
ingful negotiation.’” Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 2010) (quot-
ing Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (2002)). 
138 See generally Shmuel I. Becher, A “Fair Contracts” Approval Mechanism: Rec-
onciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. Mich. J.L. Re-
form 747, 773–74 (2009) (arguing that consumers cannot distinguish between compet-
ing products based on terms they do not understand). 
139 By definition, procedural terms only become relevant if a dispute arises and the 
parties are unable to amicably resolve the dispute without resort to litigation. Yet 
heuristic substitutes create a systematic bias with respect to the estimated likelihood 
of harm, with individuals typically displaying risk-seeking tendencies for low-cost but 
high-probability losses—even though they are risk averse with respect to low-
probability but high-cost losses. See Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in 
Risk Regulation, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 746–47, 753–54 (2008) (describing the biasing 
effects of information heuristics generally); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Avail-
ability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 715–35 (1999) (describing 
circular reinforcement between public and private risk judgments, risk preferences, 
and risk policy preferences); Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal 
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Racing to the Bottom/Creating a Market for Lemons. The deter-
rent value of a law depends in part upon the delta in expected costs 
as between the compliance and non-compliance states. But in the 
tort and class-action contexts, litigation costs form a substantial 
portion of the monies paid by defendants.140 Using the $2 payout by 
defendants to $1 received by plaintiff ratio of tort liability as an ex-
ample, in a bilateral commercial negotiation a shift to ex ante com-
pensation permits full aggregate compensation, while generating a 
50% aggregate cost savings for division between the parties. In re-
gimes in which compensation is sufficient to create optimal deter-
rence, the over-deterrence resulting from the incorporation of de-
fense costs may thus be eliminated and the litigation costs can be 
deployed toward alternative uses. In regimes that already possess 
optimal deterrence, however, diminished litigation costs may result 
in suboptimal deterrence and inefficient risk taking. 
Where the procedural terms are non-salient boilerplate, the ra-
tional drafting party should impose the term most favorable to it-
self, shifting the gains to salient terms (or profits or executive com-
pensation, depending upon market dynamics).141 Other 
 
Events, 4 J. Experimental Psychol. 551, 551 (1978) (reporting the systematic overes-
timation of the frequency of death from unlikely occurrences while underestimating 
the frequency of death from more common events). 
 With respect to many types of claims, the “rose-colored glasses” phenomenon—a 
prospective subset of the self-serving bias phenomenon—makes an individual suscep-
tible to appraising his own abilities as superior to those of the average person, causing 
a misperception that the individual’s own skills and talents make his odds of suffering 
misfortune far less than the general statistical probability of harm. See generally 
Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition 215 (2d ed. 1991); Russell B. 
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051, 1091 (2000). 
 As a result, as to most claims, individuals will not view procedure as a salient term 
because the prerequisite harm is not itself salient. For discussion of the behavioralist 
critique in the context of consumer arbitration agreements, see Jean R. Sternlight & 
Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Effi-
cient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 75, 
96–99 (2004). 
140 Only forty-six percent of direct costs in the tort system reach the victims, with the 
remaining fifty-four percent being lost to transaction costs such as expert-witness and 
attorneys’ fees. Congressional Budget Office, The Economics of U.S. Tort Liability: 
A Primer 20 (2003). 
141 For a discussion of the prerequisites to market functioning and perfect competi-
tion in the analogous consumer arbitration context, see Sternlight & Jensen, supra 
note 139, at 93–94. 
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manufacturers should also adopt not only the minimal procedural 
protections but also decrease expenditures on prevention to re-
main competitive—absent a concurrent increase in public en-
forcement actions—creating a race to the bottom, as the greater 
the reduction in procedural terms the greater the competitive 
benefit. The manufacturers that derive the greatest savings from 
the provision are those that have the highest liability and litigation 
costs in the default system, creating a traditional lemons problem. 
Non-salient procedural terms thus risk eviscerating the deterrent 
value of private enforcement actions, absent other systemic modifi-
cations. 
In the substantive term context, the manufacturer may neverthe-
less provide the consumer’s preferred term to capture the subset of 
informed consumers, allowing the rest to free ride.142 In the proce-
dural context, however, reverse signaling occurs: the cost of litiga-
tion can often exceed by orders of magnitude the price of the good 
purchased, and thus the company would prefer not to sell to the 
subset of individuals likely to file suit if they could be identified in 
advance. Where the projected costs fit this pattern, the corporation 
may prefer to sell to those consumers that do not view procedural 
rights as valuable but prefer not to sell to those keenly concerned 
with litigation terms, as this signals a higher than average likeli-
hood of injury or self-assessed litigiousness. To the extent that pub-
lic accounts of injury and litigation can harm corporate reputation, 
the company may further prefer to reduce sales to these individu-
als. 
Barriers to Effective Consumer Education. To the extent that in-
formation costs are a substantial impediment to consumer deci-
sionmaking, education by consumer groups is typically expected to 
occur with respect to substantive terms. As a threshold matter, 
while education can occur with simple messages like “more 
megapixels in a camera is good,” complex product dimensions are 
 
142 See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 15, at 1450; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, 
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630, 637–38 (1979). In limited, exceptional cases, the cor-
poration can discriminate, offering the preferred term to only the informed consum-
ers and the standard term to all others. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Mak-
ing Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 21–22 (2008) (offering examples from the 
consumer-credit market of sellers able to tailor products to each customer and 
thereby prevent the informed minority from driving the market). 
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frequently not susceptible to this form of aggregate education.143 
Procedure is particularly complex because it requires a comparison 
of the particular term selected with the baseline procedural re-
gimes that would have been available to this particular consumer. 
Aggregation can therefore only occur among consumers in a par-
ticular jurisdiction as the default terms available will vary from 
state to state. Moreover, the enforceability of these modified terms 
will also vary by state because state courts and legislatures have 
begun to develop their own standards for when public policy per-
mits or precludes the enforcement of a term. As a result of this 
complexity, although market interactions can inform a consumer’s 
future purchasing decisions—whether through direct experiences 
or anecdotal reports144—the effect of procedural terms appears to 
be too attenuated to be an effective educator. 
Competitors might fill this gap by proclaiming superior terms 
across all jurisdictions. However, such a campaign would inher-
ently require indirectly advertising the possibility of harm from a 
product. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine Toyota running an adver-
tisement proclaiming that its brake problems have been repaired, 
but if they fail, the consumer’s heirs will have a better statute of 
limitations or jury pool than Honda provides in a wrongful-death 
claim. Rather, advertising typically focuses on the threshold issue 
of quality of the product or the strength of warranties, which di-
minish the perceived likelihood of harm, rather than on compara-
tive advantages in litigation as between competing products. 
Not only is it uniquely difficult to educate consumers about pro-
cedural harms, but corporations may use cognitive biases and in-
formation asymmetries to manipulate consumer perceptions about 
procedural terms.145 Moreover, because the term is contained in 
 
143 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 142, at 20 (describing the Citi universal de-
fault education initiative and its failure). 
144 See Samuel Issacharoff, Disclosure, Agents and Consumer Protection 3–4 (Law 
& Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-33, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640624 (discussing the role of customer-review websites in 
consumer education). 
145 For a general discussion of the use of individual behavioral biases to the corpora-
tion’s advantage in the context of substantive terms, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. 
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 643–93 (1999). For arguments that this shortfall may require gov-
ernment intervention, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1425 
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boilerplate, even if education is successful, it will take only hours 
for competitors to change terms in their online contracts (or per-
haps weeks for paper contracts). This reality dramatically limits the 
potential return on the substantial costs of an educational initia-
tive.146 
Conclusion. The natural functioning of markets explains not 
only the dichotomy in the types of procedural private ordering 
provisions and outcomes in a way consonant with the intuitions of 
scholars and the courts as to which contracts are normatively pre-
ferred, but also the failure of the market to self-correct. First, in 
contrast to a substantive waiver of rights, the effect of procedural 
waivers is not facially evident—as exemplified by expecting con-
sumers to know that agreeing to arbitration implicitly waives one’s 
class-action rights and in turn makes small-value claims function-
ally difficult to pursue.147 Second, in contrast to the traditional as-
sumption of educated consumers, the costs of information are 
uniquely high with respect to legal terms, such that a rational con-
sumer will not investigate the term. Moreover, corporations can 
use unilateral amendment provisions to multiply this cost, a feature 
common to only limited areas (like credit terms) and uncommon to 
traditional products (like car purchases). Third, customer-review 
websites such as Yelp and published ratings from the likes of C-Net 
and Consumer Reports are unlikely to take hold as the balance of 
competing sets of rights is highly geographically specific, creating 
high costs but low spreading. Fourth, because consumers are resul-
tantly rationally uninformed, not only should corporations create 
waiver provisions for low-value harms but they should select fo-
rums and terms that consumers are likely to mistake as neutral or 
even wrongly perceive as beneficial to the consumer with respect 
to high-value claims. Fifth and finally, in contrast to the traditional 
model in which uninformed consumers can free ride upon the 
benefits obtained by informed consumers, corporations will af-
firmatively prefer to use the disfavored term as a mechanism for 
screening out informed consumers in many circumstances. 
 
(1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Evidence]; Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
1471, 1473 (1998). 
146 Hanson & Kysar, Evidence, supra note 145, at 1425. 
147 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010). 
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To the extent that the dichotomy is derived from unique infor-
mation cost asymmetries and erroneous decisionmaking heuristics 
that are exacerbated for procedural waivers beyond the ordinary 
asymmetries relating to warranties or substantive waivers, a system 
of private ordering should seek to correct this imbalance or deny 
enforcement. Yet, since Carnival Cruise Lines,148 federal law has 
not imposed a heightened standard upon these contracts but has 
instead applied the same fundamental fairness and reasonableness 
inquiries to all claims—over-enforcing those claims subject to 
unique information cost asymmetries, while under-enforcing com-
mercial bargains not subject to asymmetric costs. 
Even with perfect information, certain consumers may be par-
ticularly willing to exchange their rights for short-term, immediate 
compensation. These tradeoffs are likely to be made by the weak-
est and most disempowered individuals, who are the most willing 
to accept inferior terms to shift resources toward other, more valu-
able necessities.149 This observation implicates the broader norma-
tive purposes of civil procedure, forcing us to consider whether an 
individual should have the right to trade access to the court system 
for a superior pricing term or whether access to courts is an inal-
ienable right in our system—the questions addressed by the re-
mainder of this Part. 
B. Judicial Integrity, Legitimacy, and the Sine Qua Non of 
Procedure 
Traditionally, civil procedure has been concerned with ascertain-
ing the optimal balance of cost and efficiency while also ensuring 
that the public structure has safeguards sufficient to protect the in-
dividual.150 Procedural due process doctrine represents the apo-
 
148 Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591–95 (1991). 
149 See Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference 
Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 451, 464–75 (2008). 
150 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347–48 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970); cf. Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem 
with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 485, 487–93 
(2003) (describing and analyzing the “ex ante” approach to procedural fairness, in 
which procedure is viewed through the lens of what parties would contract for ex 
ante). 
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theosis of this trend,151 undergirded primarily by two normative 
values: the public interest in adversarial presentation as necessary 
to preserve the judicial function152 and the private interest in mean-
ingful participation as the sine qua non of judicial legitimacy.153 
While the structure of the rules of civil procedure ensured both of 
these values, the individual retained the right to waive the private 
interest in due process by waiving his right to participate ex post.154 
The rise of a market-based system of procedure inverts this in-
quiry. Under such a system, no longer is the primary question how 
the public rules structure should be designed to protect the private 
individual’s interest from public intrusion; instead, the question is 
what restrictions upon party-driven procedure must be incorpo-
rated to protect the public interest. 
The quintessence of the inversion lies in the definition of the ir-
reducible core of the public interest in procedure. As a threshold 
matter, it is self-evident that contractual provisions can neither 
provide for procedures that are forbidden by the Constitution or 
statute nor extend the judicial power beyond its existing author-
ity.155 For example, parties could not contract for three-judge dis-
trict court tribunals, for a particular district-court judge to hear the 
case or to waive the amount-in-controversy requirement of diver-
sity jurisdiction—as these would directly conflict with existing 
 
151 While the original American view of private ordering as limited by due process 
has dominated the conception of these limitations, the modern ability of parties to 
knowingly and voluntarily waive due process rights reduces the effectiveness of a due-
process-based restriction on contractual procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Rad-
datz, 447 U.S. 667, 698 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that “flip[ping] a 
coin” as a mechanism for judicial decisionmaking “is forbidden by the requirements 
of fair adjudicative procedure that the Due Process Clause reflects”). 
152 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 
353, 382 (1978). 
153 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 273–312 
(2004). 
154 See John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 580 
(1984) (arguing for broader constitutional limitations on civil procedure); Solum, su-
pra note 153, at 275 (“Only an option or right is required [to satisfy the normative 
goal of meaningful participation] because participation may be voluntarily for-
sworn.”). 
155 See generally U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1–2; Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 
514 (2006) (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear 
a case, can never be forfeited or waived.” (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 
625, 630 (2002))). 
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mandatory limitations upon the form and function of the courts. 
But beyond conflicts with mandatory rules deciding the identity 
and composition of the judicial body, what restrictions upon pro-
cedural contracting are necessary to protect judicial integrity and 
functioning? 
Although the procedural private ordering debate is nascent, the 
fault lines are already clear as the questions are far broader than 
the enforceability of ex ante procedural contracts. But to the extent 
that the question is narrowly presented as in what circumstances 
public concerns override the private interest in modifying a par-
ticular procedure, the well-developed existing restrictions upon 
parties’ ex post revision of procedure provide a logical starting 
point. The existing tripartite structure of limitations upon ex post 
private ordering—derived from the plain language of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, constitutional limitations, local rules, and 
judicial standing orders156—categorizes procedural modifications 
made through ex post stipulation as either immediately enforce-
able,157 enforceable with court approval,158 or void ab initio.159 Within 
this structure, the courts have already weighed almost every proce-
dural right not expressly placed in one of these categories, balanc-
ing the competing public and private rights in the context of ex 
 
156 Notwithstanding the well-developed body of district-court rulings on the waiv-
ability of individual procedures, scholarly debate continues as to whether the rules are 
presumptively mandatory or default procedures. Compare Stephen C. Yeazell, Civil 
Procedure 138 (7th ed. 2008) (“One of the hallmarks of U.S. law is the extent to which 
the rules of procedure are ‘default’ rules.”), with Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 13, at 
1103 (arguing that the Rules are mandatory). 
157 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (waiver of notice); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (consent 
to late amendment); Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 (stipulation of deposition and discovery proce-
dures); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (stipulations regarding deposition testimony); Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 33(a)(1) (stipulation of the number of interrogatories); Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d) (jury 
trial waiver). 
158 Typically, this designation reflects concerns with the court’s administration of its 
cases, public externalities, or in the case of class actions, the heightened protection 
provided to absent class members. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (settlement of class 
action); Fed. R. Civ. P. 29(b) (discovery extensions that modify court deadlines); Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(B) (deposition of incarcerated deponent). 
159 See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (“Rule 
52 is . . . as binding as any statute duly enacted by Congress, and federal courts have 
no more discretion to disregard the Rule’s mandate than they do to disregard consti-
tutional or statutory provisions.”); Smith v. Gulf Oil Co., 995 F.2d 638, 645–46 (6th 
Cir. 1993) (stating that the mandatory language of Rule 47’s jury composition re-
quirement cannot be overcome by court order but finding harmless error). 
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post stipulations made during the litigation process. By their essen-
tial nature, these individualized determinations reflect the particu-
lar competing interests with respect to the term at issue in a way 
that a per se rule broadly applicable across all procedural terms 
cannot. 
From this default assumption of symmetry between ex ante and 
ex post procedural contracts, arguments can be made for deviation 
in both directions. On the one hand, one might argue for stronger 
public control of ex ante contracts to avoid evisceration of the pub-
lic purposes and aims embodied by the rules of procedure. On the 
other hand, one might argue for lesser controls on ex ante con-
tracts, either from the view that disputes are inherently private and 
thus that parties should have broad control over the mechanisms of 
dispute resolution or as a method of enhancing private ordering of 
law generally. 
The assumption of the first perspective, which I term “ex ante 
exceptionalism,” is that engrafting the litigation system’s restric-
tions applicable to ex post procedural contracts would fail to obtain 
the desired normative outcomes with respect to ex ante contracts. 
Ex ante exceptionalism has a powerful intuitive appeal. Indeed, it 
is for this reason that some states invalidate ex ante jury-trial waiv-
ers160 while allowing one to waive his rights ex post not only af-
firmatively but by merely failing to affirmatively demand a jury.161 
But what distinguishes the ex post and ex ante settings? The effect 
on the judicial proceeding of a pro se litigant is constant whether 
the individual waives representation through a pre-dispute waiver, 
post-dispute stipulation, or simply decides not to retain counsel.162 
Thus, we cannot justify a prohibition upon ex ante procedural con-
tracting on the basis of the imposition placed upon the judiciary, 
since our judicial system already countenances these modifications 
in the ex post context. Instead, the overriding concern presented by 
ex ante procedural contracting is that the individual may not zeal-
ously represent his own interests ex ante, making concessions that 
he would not make ex post—whether due to cognitive biases, a 
 
160 See Landis, supra note 42, at 691–92 (recognizing enforcement in all federal cir-
cuits). 
161 Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d). 
162 See Fuller, supra note 152, at 383 (using pro se litigation as an example of intru-
sion upon the judicial role). 
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lack of understanding about the legal effect of his decision, or the 
substantial shift in valuation that occurs when the probability of 
harm and litigation changes from a fractional percentage to a cer-
tainty.163 Yet these are the concerns of market failure, not the con-
cerns of judicial integrity. 
Once these concerns are bifurcated, having permitted party 
autonomy ex post, the execution of identical waivers or modifica-
tions ex ante should be of little concern between sophisticated 
commercial actors—underscoring that the concern is a manifesta-
tion of perceived market failure and paternalism rather than of the 
functioning of the judiciary. To be sure, market failure may be so 
severe that it undermines the individual’s conception of the legiti-
macy of the judiciary, but this legitimization-loss is a byproduct of 
the market failure rather than a direct concern of judicial integrity. 
Thus, by regulating these concerns as ones of market failure, the 
system can more precisely target the particular circumstances of 
market failure and avoid under-enforcing bargains made in func-
tioning markets that are not a threat to judicial integrity. 
To test this assertion, consider two challenges frequently offered 
to procedural private ordering. First, parties should not have the 
opportunity to create their own procedural rules in a publicly pro-
vided litigation system; rather, they should obey the rules placed 
before them or opt out into arbitration. The two subsidiary con-
cerns of the added cost related to “mini-codes of civil procedure”164 
and the loss of meaningful precedent165 are oft-cited examples. To 
the extent that these provisions are permitted ex post, the system 
has already determined that these specific provisions are harmful 
neither to the judge’s ability to adjudicate the case in an efficient 
fashion nor to the establishment of meaningful precedent. One 
might argue that over time ex ante stipulations may be more fre-
quent and thus provisions that are currently de minimis in their ef-
fect could harm the judicial system in the aggregate. Even granting 
 
163 See, e.g., Wright et al., supra note 78, at 52 (noting that certain ex ante terms “are 
likely to be found only when there is inequality of bargaining power, and are hardly 
an appropriate means for . . . serv[ing] the public interest”). 
164 Resnik, supra note 13, at 597. 
165 See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for 
Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 852 (2002) (discussing the judicial efficiency 
of reliance upon precedent). 
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the accuracy of the underlying quantitative assumption, this argu-
ment does not make a functional distinction between ex ante and 
ex post contracts; rather, this critique simply advocates more care-
ful consideration of whether additional procedural stipulations 
should be subject to court approval. 
Second, procedural private ordering risks imposition of an incor-
rect ruling on third parties who did not consent to the modifica-
tions.166 This problem is not unique to procedure. Parties subopti-
mally invest with respect to disputes more broadly, with procedure 
becoming just one facet of this under-investment—along with un-
der-investment in fact development, motion practice, and other as-
pects of the litigation process. To the extent that the rules govern-
ing preclusion, intervention, and real parties in interest do not 
supply adequate protections, the problem is not one unique to pro-
cedural private ordering; rather, procedural under-investment is 
simply one manifestation of a broader problem. The better solu-
tion is to increase these protections with respect to both procedural 
and substantive investments rather than to modify procedure 
alone. Indeed, generating substantial third-party protections for 
procedure in isolation—such as voiding any ex ante procedural 
contract if a non-party to the contract is involved in the litigation—
would create its own incentives for abuse by encouraging sham 
plaintiffs or defendants in a fashion akin to the wrangling 
prompted by complete diversity requirements. 
Converse to the ex ante exceptionalist approach, some might ar-
gue that ex ante contracts should be permitted even as to matters 
that are not permitted ex post, as ex ante the parties retain the op-
tion to contract with another supplier or buyer, whereas ex post the 
parties always possess a bilateral situational monopoly. Moreover, 
ex post certainty of outcome may further divorce the individual’s 
private interest from that of the collective, as contrasted with the 
ex ante baseline. Consider the example of confidentiality agree-
ments, which have been cited as an example of ex post agreements 
in violation of the public interest.167 In the midst of settlement, the 
plaintiff may have some moral or vindication interest in public dis-
closure, but this interest is unlikely to price the term properly from 
 
166 See Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 186; Resnik, supra note 13, at 599. 
167 See Resnick, supra note 13, at 650–58. 
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a deterrence perspective as the already-harmed plaintiff has no di-
rect personal stake in the signaling value of the information. In 
contrast, ex ante each individual possesses an interest in disclosure 
that will, in the aggregate, more closely approximate the defen-
dant’s stakes. While this example seems to lend support to a more 
permissive standard for ex ante contracting, a review of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure reveals this example as an anomaly. Most 
ex post restrictions upon private ordering do not reflect this con-
cern with power imbalances or market failure but instead insulate 
the court’s internal housekeeping authority—a public interest that 
would be harmed to the same extent ex ante or ex post.168 
The existing restrictions upon ex post private ordering represent 
the combined wisdom of the legislature and courts as to the limita-
tions necessary to ensure judicial integrity with respect to both the 
individual and third parties. The discomfort with ex ante proce-
dural contracting is not that the term’s effect upon the proceeding 
is qualitatively different if entered into ex ante but that pre-dispute 
the parties may lack the information to make informed judgments 
about the litigation process. In exceptional circumstances, this pat-
tern is inverted with ex ante uncertainty generating superior results 
as contrasted with the ex post settlement market. Both sets of con-
cerns overlap with those of the market to the extent that situational 
monopolies, cognitive biases, and information-cost asymmetries 
deprive the individual of meaningful opportunity to consider the 
provision and determine whether to accept it. But, if these asym-
metries can be corrected, then a default rule of symmetry would 
reduce litigation costs through the incorporation of substantial ex-
isting precedent while simultaneously providing a baseline rule 
with a high degree of accuracy. Moreover, this rule would facilitate 
alteration by the rules committee or legislature as individual pro-
cedures are identified as warranting a greater or lesser degree of 
modification ex ante or as best practices change and evolve. 
C. The Public Interest in Private Rights of Action 
Despite the potential tension inherent to the duality of private 
rights of action as simultaneously public and private mechanisms 
for justice, these roles were traditionally consonant. The public in-
 
168 See supra text accompanying notes 156–159. 
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terest in deterrence suffered only minimal intrusion from allowing 
individuals to retain absolute ex post control of their claims with 
respect to litigation strategy and settlement because the deterrent 
effect of a law is an ex ante calculation based upon the likely com-
parative effects of compliance and non-compliance.169 The proce-
dural rules comport with this understanding, presumptively permit-
ting plaintiffs broad control over the prosecution of their private 
rights of action subject to limited exceptions.170 
The existing procedural private ordering doctrine extends this 
control to ex ante contracts, enforcing procedural modifications 
across all manner of civil claims unless the challenging party can 
conclusively demonstrate that the provision prevents vindication of 
her rights. Mere risks of preclusion or impairments must be 
borne—even where there is a substantial effect on the viability or 
existence of the underlying substantive claim171—unless there is a 
direct conflict with the statutory language as narrowly construed.172 
Yet unlike most ex post procedural contracts, permitting ex ante 
modification allows parties to affect deterrence by affirmatively 
changing the expected average outcomes in the compliance and 
non-compliance states at the time of performance.173 The most so-
phisticated procedural contracts are able to sever the tie between 
compensation and deterrence interests, thus creating a choice for 
 
169 For a discussion of the relative deterrence effects of public and private enforce-
ment regimes, see Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Re-
structuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 
108 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1349–62 (2008). 
170 Indeed, the most frequent outcome in litigation is settlement, in which the parties 
waive all remaining process. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: 
Shading in the Gray, 70 Judicature 161, 163 (1986) (reporting that sixty-three percent 
of cases are settled, seven percent are tried, and the remainder are dismissed, arbi-
trated, or resolved by motion); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Conse-
quences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 631, 638 (1994) (indicating that 
the percentage of cases settled more than doubled between 1940 and 1990). 
171 See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 
(1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 & n.19 
(1985). 
172 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595–96 (1991). 
173 There is, of course, no reason that compensation and deterrence need to be inter-
twined, as David Rosenberg has repeatedly argued; rather, this selection was simply 
one from many possible alternatives. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deter-
rence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 
Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1916–19 (2002). 
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the individual between the public and private interest in litiga-
tion.174 As a result, procedural private ordering not only diminishes 
the natural consonance between public and private aims but can be 
used to place these two interests in direct conflict. 
It may well be argued that the same dynamic exists with respect 
to substantive terms: private parties often waive particular substan-
tive rights in pre-litigation agreements. But with respect to substan-
tive waivers, parties are only permitted to waive rights created by 
default rules; mandatory rights are, by definition, non-waivable. In 
contrast, in the procedural context, the courts are allowing parties 
to contract around even non-waivable laws if the waiver is effectu-
ated through a procedural election rather than a direct substantive 
waiver.175 In this way, procedural private ordering reshapes the 
public role of law, making even purportedly non-waivable, manda-
tory laws a mere default among contracting parties rather than a 
means of enforcing public policy. 
This Section explores the public-private tension, comparing the 
competing claims of interest and offering a method for determining 
in which circumstances public or private interests should prevail 
and, resultantly, when ex ante procedural contracts should be en-
forceable. 
1. Contracting Around Non-Waivable Rights 
The Constitution, Congress, and states have deemed certain 
rights so paramount, whether because of the public values or public 
interests they implicate, that they are removed entirely from the 
bargaining table; no waiver or even impairment of these rights is 
permitted.176 Since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Supreme 
 
174 See supra Section I.B. 
175 See, e.g., Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (enforcing a clause that would force a claim to be brought in London under 
English law despite “the plain language of the anti-waiver provisions” in federal secu-
rities statutes). 
176 These rights that cannot be waived ex ante cover many of the areas considered 
most fundamental to daily life, including family law, employment law, and labor law, 
as well as areas of fundamental public economic concern, such as antitrust law, securi-
ties law, and tort law, to name a few. Within these spheres, certain areas may be 
carved out as non-waivable (such as parental rights, slavery, minimum wage, over-
time, and safe working conditions) while other areas remain conditionally or freely 
waivable (such as alimony and overtime for salaried employees). 
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Court has readily acknowledged that the line between substance 
and procedure cannot be drawn with any certainty.177 Yet, if proce-
dural waivers and modifications are permitted where substantive 
waivers are expressly prohibited, the notoriously indistinct bound-
ary between substance and procedure becomes determinative, 
prompting a hydraulic pressure toward the use of the less-restricted 
method; in this case, the use of procedure to accomplish the pro-
hibited substantive ends. 
By designating certain rights as non-waivable, the legislature 
removes alienability from the bundle of rights associated with the 
private right of action. It may well be that certain designations of 
inalienability are made in part for demonstrative reasons—as with 
the prohibition of slavery. But to the extent that these designations 
are intended to have a behavior-shaping role, it is effectuated 
through the expected comparative costs of non-compliance. As 
with a substantive waiver or limit, because a procedural modifica-
tion is known to both parties prior to performance, it can alter per-
formance and compliance with the statutory obligation. To the ex-
tent that the defendant estimates its exposure as less under the 
terms of the provision than under the baseline no-contract state, 
the defendant will be willing to bear a lesser degree of cost to avoid 
liability, and thus deterrence and compliance with the statute may 
decrease.178 
For illustrative purposes, consider a jury-trial waiver applicable 
to an employment-discrimination claim that reduces plaintiff’s ex-
pected recovery from $104,640 to $10,400 through a combination of 
decreased likelihood of liability and decreased damages.179 From a 
deterrence perspective, the corporation should now be willing to 
bear only minimal costs to avoid litigation and thus may fail to in-
vest in expensive but formerly cost-effective anti-discrimination 
 
177 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring) (“The line between procedural and 
substantive law is hazy . . . .”); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 427 
(1996) (describing the identification of the line between substance and procedure as a 
“challenging endeavor”); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (“The line be-
tween ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ shifts as the legal context changes.”). 
178 See supra Section I.B. 
179 For purposes of simplicity, I exclude litigation costs from the analysis, recognizing 
the interrelated nature of litigation costs and nuisance-value suits, which may margin-
ally decrease as the litigation costs decrease with waiver, altering the gap between the 
compliance and non-compliance states. 
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training or monitoring of trends in pay, promotion, or performance 
reviews for indicia of ongoing discrimination. So too, from a com-
pensation perspective, the expected recovery for any particular 
plaintiff is now reduced by ninety percent, substantially reducing 
the performance of the compensation function as against the no-
contract state. In comparison, a damages cap should not affect the 
likelihood of liability, but the level of the cap could be adjusted to 
result in the same ninety percent decrease in expected damages. 
These prohibitions would have different effects upon likelihood of 
suit and ultimate recovery at trial, with the procedural waiver pro-
viding a greater disincentive toward weak claims but greater com-
pensation if liability were to be found. In a world of settlement, 
however, the two restrictions have commensurate effects upon the 
defendant’s expected gross payout in each of the two compliance 
states and thus similar effects upon deterrence.180 The same symme-
try of effect upon the statutory aims occurs with respect to proce-
dural alterations that de facto waive a claim rather than simply lim-
iting it. 
Permitting ex ante procedural contracting thus effectively re-
stores to the bundle of rights the alienability that the legislature 
expressly removed. Yet it does so in a more opaque manner, which 
I argue should be even more normatively disfavored than a direct 
substantive waiver. Bundled elections require an understanding of 
the comparative expected liability and costs across all potentially 
applicable systems of law that is not facially evident in the contract-
ing language. Likewise, unbundled elections require speculation as 
to the interaction of provisions with the expected cause of action 
and litigation strategy. Thus, in contrast to a substantive waiver, 
which facially makes apparent the substantive right that is being 
waived, a procedural waiver is a probabilistic instrument, which fo-
cuses upon procedural effects and thus makes no mention of the 
effect upon the underlying substantive right. 
 
180 So, too, while there may be some small difference in settlement values in particu-
lar cases under the competing regimes, the discovery costs that would be required to 
identify the comparative merits of each claim prerequisite to a differential in payout 
would likely vastly exceed the net differential in settlement values between claims. As 
a result, actual settlement values are unlikely to vary substantially enough to affect 
the compensatory function of the law. 
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If procedural waivers result in the constitutionally or statutorily 
barred substantive outcome, is there any justification for the exist-
ing doctrine’s broad enforcement with respect to non-waivable 
claims? One potential explanation for the doctrine’s deference to-
ward private ordering is a belief that the parties will select modifi-
cations that enhance efficiency and promote underlying enforce-
ment. Surely, there are cases in which procedural terms would not 
violate the public interest that motivated the non-waivability de-
termination, just as there are substantive modifications that could 
be made by contract that nevertheless do no violence to the public 
interest. But this subjectivity does not comport with the clear legis-
lative directive that these rights are not subject to private contract. 
A second potential explanation is that courts view procedural 
modifications as de minimis. This explanation, however, is inconsis-
tent with the existing legal standards for invalidating a procedural 
provision based upon conflict with the purposes of the underlying 
statute, which require a relatively high degree of certainty that the 
provision will preclude enforcement even as to non-waivable 
rights.181 
Troublingly, the situations in which market failure or heightened 
public interest prompted the prohibition on private bargaining are 
precisely the situations in which the parties are most likely to use 
procedural terms to subvert substantive law. In those circum-
stances in which the parties would have reached the publicly de-
sired outcome, the statutory bar on contract has relatively less ef-
fect as the parties would have contracted for the same outcome in 
the absence of the statute. In contrast, in those situations in which 
the substantive law has the greatest effect by precluding parties 
from reaching arrangements in contravention of the legislatively 
determined public interest, allowing private ordering creates a 
mechanism for parties to reach their preferred outcome notwith-
standing the statutory prohibition.182 As the panoply of procedural 
 
181 See supra Section I.B (illustrating that many routinely approved provisions, like 
forum selection, have a substantial rather than de minimis effect upon substantive 
outcomes). 
182 Minimum-wage laws follow this paradigm: workers who have sufficient bargain-
ing power will contract for greater than minimum wage; those who do not have 
enough bargaining power, and thus rely upon the law, will still lack bargaining power 
to mandate a term that facilitates enforcement. The employer, who would be a price-
setter but for the statute, is thus able to use this power to mandate procedural terms 
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rights subject to private ordering expands and parties’ sophistica-
tion in crafting customized procedural provisions increases, parties 
can use provisions in tandem through “procedural stacking” of un-
bundled terms, making the effect far more opaque and uncertain—
and thus difficult to monitor under the existing doctrine. 
2. Procedural Waivers and Enforcement of Waivable Rights 
By definition, waivable rights are those for which the legislature 
has issued no pronouncement that the public interest should trump 
the private interest and has only designated a right to one party, fa-
cilitating private bargaining.183 Yet, the private right of action is an 
important component of obtaining enforcement under many statu-
tory frameworks, alleviating the burden upon public enforcement 
mechanisms.184 Against this backdrop, procedural private ordering 
necessitates determination of whether, if the right is itself fully 
waivable, any justification exists for limiting the lesser waiver of 
the appurtenant procedural rights. 
Ex ante procedural contracts necessarily apply only between 
contracting parties. As a result, broad enforcement creates a bifur-
cated world in which parties may engage in procedural private or-
dering—and thus readjust the deterrent effect of laws—in contrac-
tual relationships even though other claims remain governed by the 
default rules. Thus, contracting parties are able to shift compensa-
tion and enforcement to fit their private interests, while the pub-
licly set defaults protect those individuals who have no relation to 
one another or who have not elected to contract with each other. 
This naturally arising dichotomy has some intuitive appeal: where 
parties are entering into a contractual relationship, they have the 
opportunity to assess the other’s reputation and their own interests 
and to decide upon the level of assurance they prefer for their obli-
 
undermining the enforceability of the minimum-wage law. Absent defenses to the en-
forcement of these terms, the employee must rely upon a public enforcement action 
to vindicate his rights, having de facto waived the ability to prosecute through agree-
ment to the procedural terms. 
183 For early discussions of the power of legislative default rules, see Ian Ayres & 
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of De-
fault Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106 (2002). 
184 For a discussion of the dual nature of public and private enforcement regimes, see 
generally Rose, supra note 169. 
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gations. In contrast, where the parties are brought together by the 
liability-inducing event, ostensibly without the opportunity for due 
diligence, a stronger need for state protection is apparent. 
Notwithstanding this intuitive appeal, many lower courts and 
state courts have attempted to use contract doctrine—most nota-
bly, unconscionability—to avoid enforcement of procedural 
terms.185 For purposes of analyzing the validity of the unconscion-
ability critique of private ordering, I have selected the example of 
the class waiver as it exemplifies the broader public-private tension 
and is one of the most contested procedural devices.186 Because the 
potential conflict between the individual’s pursuit of compensation 
and society’s interest in deterrence and enforcement appears with 
varying degree depending upon the particular procedural modifica-
tion, this analysis is a mere exemplar of the nature of this conflict. 
The Rational Private Interest in Ex Ante Waiver. Individuals typi-
cally underestimate the risk of high probability events, resulting in 
risk-seeking tendencies.187 Moreover, because these harms tend to 
be minor, there is less concern with the risk of error as these are 
the types of harms and slights we typically bear in life without re-
sorting to litigation. Indeed, negative-value actions are those 
which, if caused on a one-off rather than a class basis, would not be 
pursued.188 Thus, as to this class of small-value claims, most indi-
viduals will readily accept compensation in exchange for even the 
de facto waiver of claims resulting from a class-waiver provision.189 
 
185 See Bruhl, supra note 11, at 1422. 
186 For a comprehensive review of literature addressing the normative questions 
raised by and tension between the individual and the collective, see David L. Shapiro, 
Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 914 & n.2 
(1998). 
187 See, e.g., Lichtenstein et al., supra note 139, at 574–77 (reporting systematic over-
estimation of the frequency of death from unlikely occurrences and underestimation 
of the frequency of death from more common events); Michael S. Wogalter et al., 
Risk Perception of Common Consumer Products: Judgments of Accident Frequency 
and Precautionary Intent, 24 J. Safety Res. 97, 100 (1993). 
188 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liabil-
ity, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 1442 (2010) (arguing that for products as to which market 
forces and regulation are strong, product liability is unnecessary but that product li-
ability serves a useful purpose for harms to non-buyers like, presciently, “fishermen 
harmed by an oil spill”). 
189 Psychological phenomena, including risk aversion, vary in strength between indi-
viduals. See generally Jason Scott Johnston, Paradoxes of the Safe Society: A Ra-
tional Actor Approach to the Reconceptualization of Risk and the Reformation of 
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In contrast, individuals are likely to overestimate the risk of 
high-value, low-probability claims, taking a risk-averse position.190 
Because these high-value claims threaten potentially catastrophic 
or ruinous liability, the individual may seek to preserve the claim 
as an imperfect form of warranty or insurance. Cognitive biases 
will prompt the individual to demand a premium to surrender this 
particular set of claims—a demand that could exceed the value of 
the waiver to the corporation. The class waiver avoids this problem 
as the individual waives the right to participate in a class action but 
not the right to litigate; this affords him the opportunity to pursue 
his own (by definition, monetarily viable) claim rather than being 
swept into a class that he may or may not expect will best represent 
his interests. 
Notwithstanding the behavioralist undertones I ascribe to con-
sumers’ assent to these waivers, these are precisely the same deci-
sions rational individuals with perfect information should make—
preferring a class-action waiver even to the extent that it functions 
as a de facto waiver of small-value claims.191 For the individual, if a 
waiver is offered at a value that exceeds the expected future recov-
ery, he should rationally accept the term. This condition is easily 
satisfied: the parties will spend more than a dollar disputing every 
dollar recovered, generating a large zone of potential agreement in 
which both parties will be in a superior position for settling rather 
than litigating the dispute.192 By agreeing to ex ante compensation, 
the individual will receive a greater pro rata share of compensation 
than if he litigated ex post. Moreover, the immediate availability of 
these funds permits the individual to obtain insurance that provides 
objectively superior coverage—it is universal rather than limited to 
a particular claim, provides compensation without the delay inher-
ent in a liability determination, and diminishes the substantial risk 
of recovering nothing before an unpredictable jury. 
 
Risk Regulation, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 747 (2003). While the phenomena described here 
are robust and widely accepted, they will apply to “most” of the population—a dy-
namic sufficient to impact the market in the manner described herein. 
190 See Lichtenstein et al., supra note 139, at 574–77. 
191 To distinguish the normative considerations here from those of market failure 
previously discussed, I assume that the individual has perfect information and is not 
subject to the information asymmetries and sources of market failure previously iden-
tified except as otherwise noted. 
192 See text accompanying supra note 140. 
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In practice this stark choice is becoming less common. Corpora-
tions have limited the effect of the waiver on small-value claims by 
providing for streamlined dispute resolution and super-
compensation or incentive payments193 to avoid an allegation that 
the waiver rendered the claim non-viable in contravention of Car-
nival Cruise Lines.194 These provisions have generated substantial 
cost savings for corporations while still providing full—or even su-
per—compensation to individuals who have an interest in pursuing 
their claims by reallocating funds from third-party attorneys or ab-
sent class members to the handful of individuals who pursue relief. 
Thus, whether an individual expects litigation to ensue or not, a 
one-shot player should rationally elect the waiver. 
If the procedural terms are salient proxies for quality, the indi-
vidual’s self-interest could result in an interest functionally analo-
gous to the deterrence interest, notwithstanding the temporal dis-
tortion between the two situations. If a warranty term is 
simultaneously provided, however, this term may be perceived as a 
more direct proxy for quality than a procedural term. Thus, the 
corporation can disaggregate the present interest in the quality of 
this item from a prospective interest in deterrence relating to the 
production of future items.195 This subjugation of deterrence is es-
pecially strong with one-shot players such as appliance or car pur-
chasers who do not expect to make another purchase for many 
years. 
Even if an individual expects to be a repeat player, the rational 
decision may nevertheless be to accept ex ante compensation for 
the procedural waiver. To the extent the pricing concession offered 
exceeds the predicted litigation recovery, the single individual’s re-
jection will not be sufficient in isolation to promote or deter behav-
ior and thus the ex ante payment should be accepted. In the class-
waiver context, this concern is particularly poignant: the strength of 
the class action device lies in its numbers. Individual plaintiffs pos-
 
193 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (noting that 
AT&T Mobility’s arbitration clause provided for streamlined procedures plus an in-
centive award up to $7,500 and double attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs receiving arbitral 
awards that exceeded the last settlement offer made by AT&T). 
194 Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591–95 (1991). 
195 Cf. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 
Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1227–28 (1983) (arguing that individual buyers make purchasing 
decisions based upon corporate reputation rather than fine print). 
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sess fractional stakes and thus cannot benefit from the scale effi-
ciencies that inure to a defendant who has an incentive to optimally 
invest in all phases of the discovery and litigation process. The 
class-action device corrects this investment asymmetry by provid-
ing both sides with equal and total stakes in the litigation outcome. 
Yet once a class exists, each individual has an incentive to opt out. 
If the class prevails, the individual can pursue a litigation strategy 
piggybacking on the class’s work product or use the class’s recov-
ery as a benchmark for his own settlement without bearing his full 
share of the litigation costs. If the class loses, the individual retains 
clean hands to pursue his own individual litigation or attempt to 
extract a nuisance-value settlement—particularly where the com-
pany seeks peace after an exhausting and financially draining litiga-
tion battle with the class. However, as each plaintiff rationally opts 
out, the asymmetric investment incentives gradually increase until 
the class collapses. Thus, to the extent that an ex ante class waiver 
is offered, an individual anticipating that others will prefer an up-
front payment—whether as a function of rational cost calculation, 
cognitive bias, or a simple desire to pay less today—will feel pres-
sure to opt out as the value of remaining in the class dwindles. 
The realities of modern class-action litigation only underscore 
this phenomenon. Class actions increasingly target minimal harms 
to broad classes of individuals,196 resulting in cy pres distributions to 
charity that have only the most tenuous and indirect effect on the 
absent class members.197 A second breed of class action targets 
harms suffered by classes of substantially unidentifiable individu-
als. In these cases, the injured individuals often receive no direct 
compensation or only a modest sum if they complete a claim form. 
Notice of the settlement and the claims procedure is then provided 
through websites or papers that everyone recognizes absent class 
members are unlikely to read, completing the legally necessary fic-
tion of notice and compensation.198 Against this backdrop, scholars 
 
196 See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 99 (2009) (“The paradigmatic application of the modern class ac-
tion . . . is to make civil claims marketable that otherwise would not be brought on an 
individual basis.”). 
197 See In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 33–34 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (noting the realities of cy pres distributions “in lieu of a class payout”). 
198 See, e.g., Azizian v. Federated Dep’t Stores, 243 F. App’x 311, 312–13 (9th Cir. 
2007) (affirming the certification of a class of cosmetics purchasers and simultaneous 
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are increasingly recognizing compensation as a fiction such that de-
terrence is the primary goal of the class action.199 Against this real-
ity, a rational and informed individual (and potential future absent 
class member) will quite properly prefer some modicum of com-
pensation today over no compensation some day. 
The Public Interest. To the extent that parties are rationally con-
tracting for class waivers that make them both better off, the trend 
toward invalidation begs the question of what public interest justi-
fies this intervention. At the outset, there is surely an argument 
that parties are without authority to mandate that the publicly 
funded legal system hear each claim individually without resort to 
either class aggregation or a multi-district litigation proceeding. 
For the moment I set aside these judicial-integrity and efficiency 
considerations200 to explore the underlying public-private conflict. 
Indeed, most of the class-waiver provisions examined by the courts 
arose in the context of class arbitration waivers,201 illustrating that 
the courts’ concern is not one of judicial integrity but of something 
more fundamental. 
If an individual could rationally prefer these agreements ex ante 
in a completely free and non-coerced setting, how can these terms 
be so one-sided as to be deemed unconscionable? There may be an 
argument that the unconscionability is not in the result but in the 
presumption that a just level of ex ante compensation was not pro-
vided.202 This explanation, while intuitive, runs afoul of unconscion-
ability’s traditional eschewal of any role in determining the “fair-
ness” of price, instead limiting its focus to non-pricing terms.203 
 
settlement based on newspaper notification, details of which are provided in Defen-
dants-Appellees’ Answering Brief at 1–3, Wilkinson v. Federated Dep’t Stores, No. 
05-15847 (9th Cir. May 25, 2006), 2006 WL 3014493); Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage 
Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2004) (vacating a court-approved settlement that 
“sold these 1.4 million claimants down the river” but also recognizing that newspaper 
notice was the best available option given unidentifiability of absent class members). 
199 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class 
Action, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1355 (1995); Shapiro, supra note 186, at 924. 
200 For discussion, see supra Sections II.A & II.B. 
201 Bruhl, supra note 11, at 1450 & n.117. 
202 Korobkin, supra note 128, at 1274–76. 
203 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 4.28, at 315–16 (3d ed. 1999). 
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Many states hold that provisions precluding aggregate prosecu-
tion of negative-value consumer claims are unconscionable.204 The 
narrow focus on low-value and negative-value claims is paradoxical 
from the perspective of the private litigant, who would be permit-
ted to waive large-value, catastrophic liability claims but not small-
value or de minimis claims for minor harms or slights—inverting 
the individual’s preference for deterring or compensating large 
harms and accepting trivial or incidental harms. 
This observation suggests that the courts perceive deterrence it-
self as a public good. There may be some truth to this concern. To 
the extent that private waivers diminish the cost of statutory viola-
tion, the public must make an offsetting accommodation to ensure 
a consistent level of deterrence, whether through enhancement of 
available penalties or reallocation of public resources to public en-
forcement to supplement decreased private enforcement.205 How-
ever, to the extent that the parties retain the legal authority to di-
rectly waive the underlying substantive claim, the system creates 
the same deterrence effects. Thus, to the extent that the legislature 
perceives ex ante waiver—whether procedural or substantive—as 
too great a threat to its statutory scheme to bear, these waivers are 
banned. But where the legislature has expressly approved bargain-
ing, the courts have failed to articulate a permissible policy justifi-
cation for limiting waiver absent market failure. This conclusion is 
reinforced by the predominant approach with respect to procedure 
that presumptively permits individuals to opt out or requires them 
to affirmatively opt in for cases involving damages.206 
Analogous to the private right of action, civil procedure has al-
ways served a dual role, ensuring both the public and private inter-
est. For some, the advent of procedural private ordering raises 
fundamental questions about whether parties should have the au-
thority to dictate how the courts should proceed. For adherents of 
this view, once parties decide to use a court rather than arbitration 
to settle a dispute, they should be bound to play by the court’s 
rules. For others, procedural contracting should be permitted to 
 
204 See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Con-
tract Law, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 761, 796 n.118 (2002) (citing cases).  
205 See Rose, supra note 169, at 1349–62. 
206 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (opt-out); see also, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) 
(2006) (opt-in). 
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the fullest extent, consistent with the broader principle of freedom 
of contract. With the recognition of the multifold duality of proce-
dural private ordering, scholars have become mired in intractable 
efforts to outline the appropriate contours of ex ante procedural 
contracting while the Court’s doctrine remains underdeveloped 
and unable to serve any of the underlying normative justifications 
for limiting the parties’ contractual terms. Part III offers an alter-
native approach consonant with the normative constraints offered 
above. 
III. A SYMMETRICAL APPROACH TO PROCEDURAL PRIVATE 
ORDERING 
This Article has argued that parties can strategically contract to 
manipulate substantive law and outcomes in a far more robust way 
than previously recognized, contravening well-established norma-
tive aims of civil procedure. The consequences of this shift toward 
procedural private ordering raise fundamental questions about the 
nature of procedural rights and justice and extend the debate about 
the limits of private ordering from the substantive to the proce-
dural arena. These questions are far too broad and complex for any 
single article to address comprehensively; rather, this Part seeks 
only to commence the dialogue about this new generation of pro-
cedural contract terms. 
This Part considers the viability of a rule of symmetry as a start-
ing point in distinguishing effectively between those procedural 
terms that promote legitimate private—and in turn public—
interests and those that instead undermine these interests. Specifi-
cally, the symmetrical theory seeks to preclude the use of proce-
dure to evade existing substantive limitations upon the alienation 
of rights. In addition, the framework invalidates attempts to use ex 
ante procedural contracts to obtain procedural modifications that 
are not permitted ex post—whether due to constitutional or juris-
prudential concerns. The theory also seeks to effectuate and ex-
tend the private interest in freedom of procedural contract by pro-
viding greater enforcement to valid uses of procedural contracting 
than is afforded under the existing doctrine, including permitting 
de facto preclusion of claims where no public interest is impinged 
by the waiver. 
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The symmetrical theory of procedure proposes accommodating 
the competing interests in accuracy and efficiency by relying upon 
determinations about the amenability of terms to modification by 
private contract that already exist within the law. This Part pro-
poses two substantial limitations upon private ordering, reflecting 
those narrowly tailored areas in which the public interest has been 
determined, under existing law, to require a restriction upon pri-
vate contracting. First, under existing law, certain rights are desig-
nated as beyond the ambit of ex ante bargain. It follows that if the 
right cannot be directly impaired by a substantive limitation, it 
should not be impaired by a procedural modification that has an 
equally great effect on the effectuation of the underlying right. A 
rule to the contrary would create hydraulic pressure toward the use 
of procedure to contract away those rights the legislature has al-
ready designated as non-waivable. Second, parties are permitted to 
bargain for certain alterations to the governing procedural rules 
through ex post stipulation; however, other modifications require 
court approval or are prohibited entirely. Application of these 
same restrictions to ex ante stipulations would yield the norma-
tively preferred result, permitting parties to bargain for those as-
pects of procedure that do not intrude upon judicial integrity while 
barring those modifications that would affect court functioning. 
The challenge for procedural private ordering is not merely to 
balance the competing policy values favoring broad and narrow 
limitations, respectively; it is to reach an accommodation of the 
competing interests in a manner that provides ex ante certainty of 
contract and ex post judicial efficiency such that procedural wran-
gling does not predominate over substance. Looking to the waiv-
ability of the substantive right provides an attractive accommoda-
tion of all of the contractual, constitutional, statutory, and 
procedural concerns. The symmetrical theory of procedure pro-
posed here provides the individualized balancing of policy con-
cerns inherent to ensuring that procedural values are satisfied, in-
corporating both the preeminence of public interest over private 
interest in select substantive areas. My argument, I should empha-
size, is not that any of these factors uniquely requires a focus upon 
substantive law as the starting point of procedural private ordering. 
Rather, it is that even if we reform our approach to private order-
ing away from the flawed test of outcome determination and to-
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ward a direct inquiry into each of the values at stake, the inquiry 
becomes so elaborate and resource-intensive that it collapses under 
its own weight, becoming a wholly impractical solution to proce-
dural private ordering’s unique amalgamation of contract, civil 
procedure, and constitutional law. It is the ability of the symmetri-
cal theory of procedure to provide an efficient yet robust default 
rule across the numerous value domains that provides its claim to 
acceptance. 
A. Returning to Procedure as the Handmaiden of Substance 
Procedure’s central aim is to function as the handmaiden of sub-
stance, creating procedures that optimally facilitate its enforce-
ment.207 But over the last century, the handmaiden’s power to over-
shadow its master has become clear.208 The Supreme Court 
established and just as quickly retreated from the outcome-
determinativeness test for distinguishing substance and proce-
dure,209 recognizing that “every procedural variation is ‘outcome-
determinative’” in some sense.210 The Court is not alone—
legislatures have embraced the use of procedural provisions as a 
sophisticated method of obtaining their intended substantive policy 
goals.211 Granting the power to modify procedure inherently in-
cludes the power to modify litigation outcomes and, in turn, the ef-
fectuation of statutory objectives.212 
Against the backdrop of this interaction between substance and 
procedure, the Carnival Cruise Lines doctrine synthesized the dis-
parate standards applicable to commercial and consumer contracts, 
 
207 See David M. Trubek, The Handmaiden’s Revenge: On Reading and Using the 
Newer Sociology of Civil Procedure, 51 Law & Contemp. Probs. 111, 115 (1988). 
208 See Issacharoff, supra note 25, at 184–85. 
209 See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
210 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
211 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1450 
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[W]ere fed-
eral courts to ignore those portions of substantive state law that operate as procedural 
devices, it could in many instances limit the ways that sovereign States may define 
their rights and remedies.”); S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 
F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995). 
212 Cf. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 430 (1996) (recognizing that a 
difference between state and federal remittitur standards would result in “substantial 
variations between state and federal money judgments”) (punctuation and alterations 
omitted). 
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enforcing all procedural terms so long as they did not completely 
and necessarily preclude the presentation of a claim or defense.213 
The new doctrine dramatically reduced the protections for indi-
viduals214 but also limited commercial parties’ long-standing power 
to use procedural mechanisms to completely preclude claims or de-
fenses.215 The Court offered no legal justification or authority for its 
conclusion that preclusion violated fundamental fairness nor for 
the analog that near-preclusion—whether due to an increase in liti-
gation costs, decrease in likelihood of liability, or decrease in dam-
ages—would not violate fundamental fairness or, in the case of 
non-waivable rights, statutory or constitutional strictures. 
Throughout this Article, I have argued that this approach not only 
lacks legal justification but is simultaneously over- and under-
inclusive, giving content to the intuitions of the Warren and Burger 
Courts. 
The alternative I posit stems from the conventional assumption 
that due process rights, like substantive rights, are waivable absent 
an extrinsic limitation on bargaining. As a result, unlike the tradi-
tional approach which deploys (theoretically) static constitutional 
limitations, the symmetrical theory allows for careful alteration 
from the baseline by Congress—facilitating both upward and 
downward departures, consistent with due process. Thus, the ques-
tion is presented whether, where substantive statutes preclude ex 
ante waiver, this prohibition merely refers to direct substantive 
waivers or to all forms of waiver, including procedural waiver. If 
statutes creating non-waivable rights expressly barred or permitted 
the waiver of “any procedural right provided by the rules of proce-
dure or the courts,” the inquiry would be at an end, as the statute 
would expressly comport with the structure that best ensures the 
 
213 See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991). 
214 This occurred not only directly but through a change in the method of interpreta-
tion used for determining substantive limitations upon alienability. Historically, the 
Court was far more willing to apply a purposive interpretation to broadly preclude 
waiver of those private rights of action important to the public interest, in contrast 
with the Rehnquist Court’s strict textualist approach. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (broadly interpreting Title VII to preclude pro-
spective waiver of discrimination claims without citation to any language in Title VII 
so stating). 
215 See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972); D.H. Overmyer 
Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188–89 (1972). 
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role of procedure as furthering substance. But if, as more com-
monly occurs, the legislature has simply created a right and recog-
nized it as non-waivable without defining the term more particu-
larly as barring substantive or procedural waivers (or both), a 
question of statutory interpretation arises. The existing doctrine 
implicitly assumes the legislature intended to bar substantive limits 
on recovery but was unconcerned by procedural terms that have 
the identical consequence of minimizing net recovery.216 The alter-
native statutory reading, promoted by the symmetrical theory of 
procedure articulated here, posits that the legislature intended to 
preclude bargaining that would limit or bar recovery whether ob-
tained through substantive or procedural means. 
To the extent that the plain language of the particular statute is 
ambiguous and susceptible to either interpretation,217 we must re-
 
216 Courts therefore enforce procedural terms with respect to even non-waivable 
claims, applying a presumption in favor of enforcement overcome only by showing 
that the plaintiff would be entirely deprived of his day in court and not merely that he 
would face excessive costs or a reduced probability of success under the contract term 
as compared with the non-waivable default rule. See, e.g., Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. 
Gucci Am., 858 F.2d 509, 511, 515 (9th Cir. 1998) (civil conspiracy, unfair trade prac-
tices); Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227, 1228, 1230–31 (6th Cir. 1995) (securi-
ties); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1356, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993) (RICO); Ri-
ley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 954, 956–57 (10th Cir. 
1992) (securities); Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1069–71 (11th Cir. 
1987) (antitrust); Exceptional Urgent Care Center v. Protomed Med., No. 5:08-CV-
284, 2009 WL 2151181, at *10 (M.D. Fla. July 13, 2009) (unfair trade practices); Pods, 
Inc. v. Paysource, Inc., No. 8:05-CV-1764, 2006 WL 1382099, at *1, *4 (M.D. Fla. May 
19, 2006) (misrepresentation and deceptive practices). 
217 While statutory interpretation is by its nature individualized, the text of a number 
of statutes may prompt the argument that the prohibition on waiver should be nar-
rowly interpreted to refer only to substantive waiver to the exclusion of procedural 
waivers. As Justice Kagan has noted, this reliance upon the canon of “expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius” is “notoriously capable of producing errors.” Elena Kagan, 
Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2328–29 (2001). While the prin-
ciple may be useful in determinations as between equals, the provision is of little use 
where the comparison is within an “essentially superior-subordinate relationship,” as 
with substance and its procedural handmaiden. Moreover, to the extent that the legis-
lature did view these limitations as within the same category, it may have intended its 
language precluding limitation of the right as a general principle, containing the sub-
categories of prohibitions on direct substantive limitations and indirect procedural 
limitations upon the effectuation of substantive rights. Congress’s language may 
therefore embody a directive to refuse enforcement of any contractual term limiting 
the newly created statutory right, in any form. Thus, in many statutes, the scope of the 
prohibition on waiver or limitation may be ambiguous as to whether procedural or 
substantive waivers, or both, are barred. 
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sort to the contextual cues embedded within the statute itself.218 By 
definition, the statutory texts at issue are those which remove 
newly granted legal rights from the ambit of ex ante bargaining. 
We need not proceed into the difficult question of why the particu-
lar right was deemed unsuitable for the free market—whether it 
was due to market failure, an overriding public interest, or even a 
personal motivation. Instead, the very fact that the market was 
perceived to fail with respect to substantive waivers—for whatever 
reason—provides a strong indication that the legislature would 
have perceived the same failure with respect to procedural terms 
operating within the same market.219 
Indeed, to read statutory or constitutional limitations on the 
waiver or limitation of rights or remedies as merely precluding ex-
press substantive waiver promotes the use of procedural methods 
to obtain the prohibited substantive outcomes. It seems unlikely 
that the legislature would prefer to incentivize or even mandate 
these opaque methods of obtaining the substantive ends over more 
transparent waivers. To the extent that its prohibition is intended 
either to protect a public normative ideal or respond to an identi-
fied or perceived category of market failure, procedural contract-
ing not only undermines these functions but affirmatively results in 
more deleterious outcomes for these normative structures than if 
no substantive restriction existed at all—thus inverting the ostensi-
ble legislative purpose. Against this recognition, it is difficult to 
conceive of any meaningful policy aims that would be furthered by 
the process of precluding substantive waivers of a claim while per-
mitting the same outcome by alternative methods such that the ul-
timate outcome is not modified, merely the conduit. 
For some, given the rarity of express legislative intent with re-
spect to procedure—and the strong likelihood that the legislature 
 
218 See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. 
L. Rev. 70, 75–76 (2006). 
219 For an excellent discussion of the use of textualism as a response to the realist 
and public choice critique of legislation as a compromise between stakeholders, such 
that no single animating intent beyond that of the text may be discerned, see id. at 73–
75. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 
98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 46 (1984) (“What Congress wanted was the compromise, not the 
objectives of the contending interests.”); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Ad-
ministrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 517 (“[T]he quest for the 
‘genuine’ legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase anyway.”). 
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failed to consider the possibility of procedural private ordering—
the adoption of either presumption of congressional intent may 
bear a somewhat fictive quality.220 Where the text is inconclusive, 
the role of the Court is to select the default rule that best comports 
with the expressed normative and policy considerations.221 The re-
striction upon ex ante substantive contracting creates a system in 
which parties may freely contract away rights through ex post set-
tlement but may not limit these rights by ex ante contract. The 
congressional concern thus is not that the individual is an incompe-
tent custodian of the right sufficient to justify a complete bar upon 
contracting or investiture of the prosecutorial right exclusively with 
a public attorney general. Instead, the apparent concern is that 
permitting ex ante waiver or limitation will uniquely impede the 
substantive aims of the statute. Again, we need not engage in 
speculation over legislative intent in an attempt to determine 
whether Congress’s concern is with ex ante undervaluation or with 
preservation of public interest, whether the concern is with ensur-
ing compensation or instead promoting deterrence. Rather, it is 
sufficient for this purpose to state that Congress determined that, 
in this particular context, permitting ex ante contractual limitations 
upon the right would preclude effectuation of its underlying policy 
aims.222 
The question of whether or not procedural terms are best seen 
as a component of the non-waivable rights or a distinct category of 
rights thus turns upon whether the same ex ante/ex post effect on 
party behavior—and in turn fulfillment of the statutory objec-
tives—applies in this context. It is not seriously contested that mere 
election between systems of public ordering through ex post forum 
selection during litigation can have substantial effects on the en-
forcement of substantive rights, just as settlement can. Because the 
election is made ex post, however, compliance is driven by the 
party’s ex ante expectations about the aggregate average outcome 
 
220 Cf. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 212 (making this argument with respect to standards of review of 
agency actions). 
221 Cf. id. (arguing the same in the context of standards of review for agency actions). 
222 See generally John F. Manning, Statutory Pragmatism and Constitutional Struc-
ture, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1162, 1168 (2007) (describing the trend toward prag-
matic textualism by judges). 
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in light of expected ex post preferences rather than by the actual ex 
post election. I have argued that the same ex ante/ex post dynamic 
exists with respect to procedure. If this is correct, then in the ab-
sence of contrary statutory language, applying the same limitation 
upon ex ante waiver of both procedural and substantive rights is 
more consonant with the purposive distinction made by the legisla-
tion. Adopting the opposite approach would, almost inevitably, re-
sult in contractual gamesmanship capable of eviscerating the pro-
tections the bar was intended to secure. As a result, whether 
because of market failure or a mutual desire to contract around 
substantive law, the parties will rationally invest resources in the 
creation of procedural terms that limit liability or act as de facto 
waivers—reducing express legislative attempts to preclude ex ante 
bargaining into little more than mere obstacles that necessitate 
careful contracting. 
B. Assessment of the Particular Term 
In addition to restrictions upon the substantive categories of 
rights subject to private ordering, the existing law limits the ability 
of parties to modify particular procedural terms. The existing tri-
partite structure reflects a careful accommodation of the parties’ 
interest in ordering their dispute, with necessary checks evolved 
over time to prevent modifications that would impose burdens or 
externalities upon the court, third parties, or the public. 
This Article posits that creating symmetry between ex post and 
ex ante agreements provides the best accommodation between ob-
taining the benefits of private ordering and protecting the public 
interest. Advocates of tighter restrictions upon private ordering 
may argue that notwithstanding the ability of litigants to make 
these modifications ex post, permitting ex ante contracting may 
impose substantial costs on the judiciary to learn the parties’ spe-
cifically created rules of evidence and procedure or harm the for-
mation of precedent to the extent that these procedural rules be-
come the basis for distinguishing one case from another. To the 
extent that a provision interferes with judicial integrity and func-
tioning, however, the harm occurs when that provision is thrust 
upon the court—without respect to whether the parties concocted 
the provision at the time of contract or during the litigation proc-
ess. It may well be the case that there is a quantitative difference in 
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the number of provisions violative of the public interest at each of 
these two points of contract, but qualitatively, the effect upon the 
court typically remains constant. This symmetry in the effect of the 
provisions argues persuasively for the imposition of the same limi-
tations. 
Treating ex ante procedural contracts as stipulations—which 
may be self-enacting, require court approval to become effective, 
or be completely invalid—offers a number of benefits. First, it of-
fers a customized level of protection with respect to each type of 
procedural modification, derived from decades of experience. Sec-
ond, because of the symmetry between ex ante and ex post con-
tracting under this approach, parties are not given increased power 
to intrude upon public ordering by simply shifting the timing of the 
contract. Third, it provides clarity to the parties ex ante regarding 
the enforceability of the provision and a ready and familiar test to 
the court ex post, harnessing the power of established rules and 
precedent. Finally, it diminishes forum-selection concerns to the 
extent that, where particular provisions are important enough to 
the parties to prompt forum shopping, they may directly contract 
for the provision to apply in any court subject to these judicial-
integrity limitations. Indeed, under this new system, forum-
selection clauses will be incentivized, as the promulgating party can 
ensure that its modifications will be enforceable as stipulations un-
der the applicable procedural rules. 
C. The Problem of Market Failure 
To this point, this Part has posited that the symmetrical theory of 
procedural contracting permits commercial parties to benefit 
broadly from bargaining for procedure, while properly identifying 
the limited circumstances in which the public interest necessitates 
denial of enforcement. But are additional limitations necessary 
where the assumption of sophisticated parties bargaining with the 
assistance of counsel is relaxed, as with form terms embedded in a 
consumer or employment contract? 
A robust literature has identified the multiplicity of sources of 
error in contracting that affect bargaining for substantive terms, 
many of which are equally applicable to procedural terms. For ex-
ample, systematic bias with respect to the likelihood of harm will 
affect the price demanded for both a direct waiver of the substan-
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tive right and a waiver of appurtenant procedural rights.223 Yet pre-
cisely because these sources of error apply equally to substantive 
and procedural rights, they are already addressed by the symmetri-
cal theory. If the legislature believes that consumers will not read 
form terms in certain circumstances and that the unknowing waiver 
of these rights is problematic, then the substantive right should not 
be waivable. It therefore follows under the symmetrical theory that 
an embedded procedural term is likewise invalid. Alternatively 
stated, to the extent that we can identify cases in which individuals 
are not reading terms and market failure is resulting, the complaint 
is not one to be remedied by procedure but instead is an error of 
substantive law. If this error is corrected with respect to substance, 
the symmetrical theory automatically corrects the error with re-
spect to procedure. Thus, my goal is not to add to this extensive lit-
erature or debate the sufficiency of the existing protections; it is to 
explore the unique areas in which procedural terms diverge from 
substantive contract terms, necessitating special additional protec-
tions beyond baseline contract law. 
By incorporating the statutory determination of the waivability 
of the right at issue and the background law of contract, supple-
mental procedural limits beyond the symmetrical theory need only 
focus on the narrower question of which specific types of market 
failure are uniquely heightened by procedural contracts. The addi-
tion of narrowly tailored limitations to bring procedural contracts 
into parity with substantive contracts is then sufficient to create op-
timal enforcement as determined by our existing doctrinal struc-
ture. 
To the extent that the courts and legislature have determined 
that the substantive right can be waived through form contracts, is 
there any reason to preclude waiver of the pendent procedural 
rights? The existing doctrine answers that no additional protections 
are needed; procedural waivers are no different from those of sub-
stance.224 To the extent that unique information cost asymmetries 
emerge, one might argue the asymmetries are irrelevant; if most 
consumers do not make buying decisions based upon these terms 
 
223 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1541–47 (1998). 
224 See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591–95 (1991). 
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and therefore may often decide to not even read the fine print, 
then the greater cost of understanding procedural terms is not ac-
tually affecting consumer behavior. Yet, the justification for unre-
stricted bargaining is the presence of a functioning market; while 
not every consumer needs to make informed choices, a sufficient 
quantity of informed consumers must be present for a functioning 
market to exist. To the extent that these asymmetries prevent the 
development of informed consumers capable of generating compe-
tition, restrictions upon the market become necessary. This con-
cern with market failure is particularly acute as procedural waivers 
relatively uniquely encourage the precise behaviors Congress 
sought to restrict by statute. 
Given these critiques, a second approach restricts the incorpora-
tion of procedural terms within form contracts.225 To the extent that 
procedural terms are non-salient terms embedded in form terms 
rarely read by the consumer or employee but which rationally 
maximally favor the defendant and preclude the consumer’s or 
employee’s rights to the greatest extent possible, the argument is 
that these terms should not be enforced. But many of the argu-
ments embedded in this approach are equally valid as applied to 
substantive terms. The unique distinguishing feature of procedural 
bargaining is the creation of substantial information cost asymme-
tries. If this asymmetry can be corrected, then there is no longer a 
distinction between procedural and substantive waivers. If this dis-
tinction can be removed, the question reverts to the traditional de-
bate as to whether markets function in the normatively preferred 
manner where unilaterally drafted form contracts shift resources 
from non-salient to salient features. To the extent one favors re-
strictions upon these contracts, these restrictions should be appli-
cable to all contract terms, not merely those of procedure. 
A third approach could seek an accommodation of the principles 
embodied by the two prior approaches, correcting the unique in-
formation cost asymmetries of procedure as a condition of en-
forcement. This approach begins from the premise that there are 
four potential information cost states with respect to procedural 
and substantive contract terms. First, both substantive terms and 
 
225 For a seminal formulation of this argument, see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1227–28 (1983). 
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procedural terms may be subject to information costs that the party 
is willing to bear in contracting; traditional sophisticated commer-
cial contracts are an archetypal example of this state. Second, the 
information costs of both substantive terms and procedural terms 
may be so high that a party is unwilling to bear these costs; this 
failure to investigate terms is often argued to exist with respect to 
form consumer contracts, which individuals often fail to read. 
Third, the party may be willing to bear the costs related to sub-
stance but not procedure. Finally, the costs of procedural but not 
substantive terms may be borne, but I would argue this category is 
largely theoretical and thus best addressed in the circumstances in 
which it arises (if any) by specific, targeted legislation. 
In either of the first two states, the symmetrical rule inherently 
provides the optimal level of enforcement. To the extent that the 
information costs do not preclude bargaining, these terms should 
readily be enforced—as in the first information cost state. Like-
wise, if the type of contract is one as to which asymmetries pre-
clude market functioning as to substantive terms such that the par-
ties are prohibited from bargaining, then the rule of symmetry 
extends this prohibition to procedural terms as well. Thus, in the 
classic case in which one contends that the consumer will not read 
the terms, the rule of symmetry grants procedural terms equal dig-
nity to substantive terms. This symmetry is particularly important 
to the extent that information asymmetries are not the sole source 
of market failure and, indeed, may be mitigated such that a func-
tioning market exists even as to non-salient terms. Because these 
factors are highly individualized, the rule as to substantive terms is 
likely to be a far more accurate baseline than adopting a per se rule 
of either enforcement or non-enforcement of procedural terms. 
The necessity of a supplement to the symmetrical theory should 
thus focus upon the special third category, in which the costs of un-
derstanding procedural terms are uniquely higher than those for 
substantive terms. Recognizing that procedure is uniquely resistant 
to market-based solutions, requiring the development over time of 
particular tribunals with reputations for fair dealing or certifica-
tion-mark systems capable of weighing competing provisions as to 
the multiplicity of jurisdictions in which a product or service is sold, 
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a disclosure regime may well provide a potential solution by di-
rectly reducing the gating information costs.226 
The oft-cited problems with disclosure include the incentive of 
corporations to overwhelm consumers with fine print that discour-
ages consumers from reading required disclosures and the failure 
even of terms disclosed in good faith to educate consumers.227 A 
successful regime might therefore need to realign corporate incen-
tives to be consistent with those of the consumer. For example, one 
might require that for a term in a non-bargained agreement to be 
enforceable, the drafting corporation must establish that the term 
was disclosed such that the average consumer of that product 
would be aware of the term and understand its significance in a 
time and manner that permits comparison shopping. This require-
ment would not require that the corporation convert the term into 
a salient one for purposes of the purchasing decision and would in-
stead place the burden on the corporation to conduct preliminary 
consumer studies to ensure that the term is understood by the av-
erage targeted purchaser if the company intends to seek enforce-
ment. As a practical matter, such a requirement might be satisfied 
where the recipients are sophisticated corporations, but it will 
likely be difficult to enforce as against unsophisticated individuals 
or businesses. 
Alternatively, one might rely upon government agencies to ap-
prove procedural terms on behalf of individuals in lieu of direct 
education. Government agencies are tasked with protecting the 
two groups most commonly cited as potential victims of form con-
tracts—consumers and employees. Thus, one could alternatively 
create a system in which form terms modifying procedure are not 
enforceable unless the individual consents with the assistance of 
counsel. A corporation seeking to modify procedure, however, 
could seek approval from the agency tasked with the administra-
tion of the statute at issue, on behalf of the consumers or employ-
ees. In this system, just as corporations seek opinion letters to gain 
approval for proposed actions, they could obtain approval of provi-
sions that they believe will truly inure to the benefit of the con-
sumer or employee. While this system would impose a far greater 
 
226 See supra Section II.A. 
227 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 142, at 20; Issacharoff, supra note 144, at 2–5. 
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restriction upon contracting, and intrusion into private ordering be-
tween the parties, corporations may deem it preferable to a com-
plete bar should corporate abuse of procedural terms warrant in-
tervention. Yet precisely because such solutions should only be 
deployed in those limited cases in which market failure exists with 
respect to procedural but not substantive terms, any such regime 
will likely need to be created on a one-off basis through targeted 
legislation rather than through a universal, one-size-fits-all solu-
tion. 
While companies have experimented with procedural modifica-
tions, a lingering uncertainty about the enforcement of procedural 
terms has temporarily diminished the perceived benefit relative to 
direct substantive waivers in form contracts. As this uncertainty is 
resolved through additional experience, this bulwark against adop-
tion should subside, resulting in more frequent use of procedural 
terms. As these provisions are more fully utilized, the need for and 
the viability of an intermediate solution—whether disclosure, 
agency approval, or other alternatives to a complete prohibition on 
the inclusion of procedural terms in form agreements—will be-
come clear based upon the ways in which procedural modification 
is used and the response of consumers thereto. The symmetrical 
theory of procedure will automatically incorporate these solutions 
into the framework of limitations on procedural contracts, to the 
extent that these insights are ultimately either engrafted into legis-
lation or become part of the broader law of general contract. 
D. The Theory Applied 
A careful consideration of the courts’ recent jurisprudence on ex 
ante procedural contracts gives some measure of the practical ef-
fect of replacing the preclusion approach with the symmetrical the-
ory of procedure. 
In Carnival Cruise Lines, the case that inaugurated broad en-
forcement of ex ante procedural contracts, the statutory scheme 
expressly invalidated any provision relieving or capping liability, as 
well as any provision that “purport[ed] . . . to lessen, weaken, or 
avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by court of competent ju-
risdiction on the question of liability . . . or the measure of damages 
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therefor.”228 Moreover, it expressly directed that such provisions 
were void as against public policy, indicating that an expansive 
reading should be given to the prohibition in light of the purpose of 
the statute.229 The Court held this language insufficient to invalidate 
the waiver of a distant forum since the term merely limited the 
plaintiff’s selection from among the available forums.230 In contrast, 
under the symmetrical approach, because the statute not only pro-
vided that a plaintiff could not waive or avoid the right to a compe-
tent court but further specified that the right could not be weak-
ened or lessened—terms that would be superfluous if read to refer 
to waiver—the term would be invalid. This comports with an intent 
to ensure that injured plaintiffs are compensated, since the net 
compensation could otherwise be vastly undermined so as to avoid 
meaningful compensation. Moreover, this reduction in net com-
pensation could be significant enough to disincentivize the com-
mencement of suit more generally, thus undermining the alterna-
tive purpose of ensuring deterrence by preventing the lessening of 
liability or frequency of private enforcement. 
Consider this doctrine as applied to an employee who, as a con-
dition of hire, agrees to a jury-trial waiver. Seeking to invalidate 
the provision, her lawyer presents evidence that the waiver will re-
duce the expected recovery by ninety percent but admits that the 
discrimination claim remains viable, just less valuable. Should the 
waiver be enforced notwithstanding a provision in the discrimina-
tion statute that precludes ex ante terms “waiving or lessening” 
damages? Applying the Court’s post-Carnival Cruise Lines method 
of interpretation, the statutory bar would not prohibit enforcement 
of the procedural term, because while the term will reduce value in 
the aggregate across cases, it is impossible to ascertain whether the 
term has that effect in this particular case. As a result, while a 
damages cap is prohibited, a jury-trial waiver is not. In contrast, 
under the symmetrical approach, because the parties are without 
authority to modify the available damages ex ante, the provision is 
unenforceable—thus ensuring that the compensation and deter-
 
228 Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595–96 (1991) (quoting 46 U.S.C. 
App. § 183c (1988)). 
229 Id. at 596. 
230 Id. 
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rence functions remain at the baseline level set by the legislature 
with respect to this non-waivable right. 
Alternatively, consider the situation of an industry wracked by 
class-action claims under a succession of waivable consumer pro-
tection laws that result in nuisance-value settlements comprised of 
substantial attorneys’ fees and residual cy pres charitable distribu-
tions rather than payments to the consumers. The company offers 
to allow consumers to waive the right to bring a class action in ex-
change for a discount on the product. Is the provision enforceable 
in federal court? Under the existing doctrine, two hurdles exist. 
First, because the waiver could be shown to economically preclude 
prosecution of the claim, it could fail the Carnival Cruise Lines 
test.231 Second, the court might extend the analysis of Shady Grove 
to hold that the provision impermissibly contracts around Rule 
23.232 In contrast, under the symmetrical theory, because the claim 
is waivable, the parties have full authority to enter into a waiver. 
Likewise, because parties retain the discretion to bring an individ-
ual claim or a class claim under Rule 23, they can contract not to 
do so. However, the parties would lack the authority to prevent the 
court from sua sponte consolidating individual claims raising com-
mon questions as that power is reserved to the court. Thus, to the 
extent that the legislature has granted substantive or procedural 
rights fully to the parties, the parties retain the authority to modify 
or waive those rights—only where the contract transcends this 
power and intrudes upon those areas removed from its sole discre-
tion should private ordering be limited. 
CONCLUSION 
While pre-dispute procedural contracts have historically elected 
between systems of public ordering, or opted out into arbitration, 
this Article has attempted to demonstrate that parties are engaging 
in private ordering by contracting for customized civil procedure. 
These contracts not only allow parties to select the optimal level of 
enforcement and features of litigation for their particular antici-
 
231 Id. at 596–97 (suggesting that a waiver would be invalid if it effectively precluded 
liability).  
232 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 
(2010). 
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pated dispute but also to use procedure to buttress their expecta-
tions about the substance of their contractual rights and obliga-
tions. Given the indisputable ability of procedure to diminish or 
preclude pursuit of substantive rights, allowing parties to create 
their own procedures inherently includes the de facto right to re-
write substantive law, absent increased public enforcement. 
A clear framework carefully tailored to the normative concerns 
imposed by permitting ex ante procedural contracting is long over-
due. While many procedural contracts provide optimal terms, the 
door remains open to contracts that de facto preclude consumers 
and employees from pursuing claims, waive non-waivable statutory 
rights, or burden the functioning of the legal system. Recognizing 
that a completely individualized approach to procedural private 
ordering is unworkable, the symmetrical theory of procedure fo-
cuses upon adapting the existing law of contract and procedure to 
the unique challenges of procedural private ordering. This new ap-
proach thus looks to whether the substantive law is subject to bar-
gaining and whether the particular term is one that parties are 
permitted to contract for ex post. 
By adopting this approach, ex ante procedural private ordering 
can be brought into alignment with the existing limitations upon 
substantive and ex post procedural contracting rather than, para-
doxically, granting parties greater ability to engage in private or-
dering in contravention of existing law. 
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